The Adventures of the Purloined Bequest, the Resident Heiress, and the Hidden Hospital System

The game is afoot again.  A series of recent articles in the media described a series of cases whose mysterious interrelationships Sherlock Holmes might have appreciated.

The Purloined Bequest

A singular article in the Wall Street Journal, entitled "Judge Rules in Case of Fortune Tied to Buffett," first made this case explicit, but some background is required to understand it.

The story focused on Long Island College Hospital, in Cobble Hill, Brooklyn, New York.  [Full disclosure: this story got my attention particularly because I grew up nearby in Brooklyn, and was born at that hospital, which was also the local hospital my parents often used.]   LICH has long been the major community hospital for downtown Brooklyn.

The story appeared to begin in 2011, per the WSJ,

 In 2011, Judge [Carolyn] Demarest approved the merger of LICH and SUNY Downstate on the condition it would keep the charitable hospital going. As part of the deal, the hospital transferred properties to Downstate estimated to be worth as much as $1 billion collectively, according to a previous court order.

The merger was supposed to keep LICH in operation as a community hospital and provider of acute care to the poor.  However, things did not work out.

 This year, however, Downstate announced plans to shut the hospital, leading to protests from Brooklyn residents and local politicians.

'It is clear that the premise upon which this Court authorized the transfer of assets has been defeated,' Justice Demarest wrote in her Aug. 20 decision, adding that Downstate had breached its contractual obligations. She cited a 'legal and moral responsibility' to correct her earlier error in approving the merger.

She directed Downstate to return all assets to the hospital's previous owner, Continuum Health Partners Inc., which subsequently said it couldn't take the reins. The court is expected to review other proposals.

The judge also discovered that hospital management had been raiding an large endowment fund intended for other purposes,

A New York state judge ruled this week that a struggling Brooklyn hospital must repay tens of millions of dollars it borrowed from an endowment set up by early investors with billionaire Warren Buffett.

The ruling aims to rectify the previous use of the money by Long Island College Hospital, which is hurting financially and was scheduled to close. Mr. Buffett in July told The Wall Street Journal that his late friends, Donald and Mildred Othmer, would have felt 'betrayed' at the way the funds were spent.

Apparently,

 The Othmers, natives of Omaha, Neb., who later lived in Brooklyn, were longtime friends of Mr. Buffett's, and each invested $25,000 with the billionaire in 1961.

When they died—he in 1995 and she in 1998—they gave away a fortune estimated at $780 million, including the $135 million permanent endowment for the hospital. The Othmer wills stipulated the interest on the endowment could be used for operating expenses but the principal should be held 'in perpetuity.'

In a series of court-approved transactions that began in 2000, the hospital borrowed from the funds repeatedly to meet short-term obligations and cover debts.

The hospital argued that the money was necessary to keep the hospital afloat, which it said the Othmers would have wanted. The transfers depleted most of the endowment, a result that came to light after the Journal wrote about the situation in July.

New York Times and Brooklyn Daily Eagle articles focused on the question of whether SUNY/ Downstate intended to close the hospital so it could sell its apparently valuable real estate assets in a now fashionable neighborhood, but not on how the hospital fell into these dire straits.


There seem to be some lingering questions -

-  If the losses and borrowing began in 2000, or earlier, who was responsible for them, given the current owners have only been in place since 2011?

Note that the phrasing in the article above ("the hospital argued that the money was necessary to keep the hospital afloat") suggested that before SUNY took over, the hospital was independent.  However, the article mentioned, albeit only briefly in passing, that the hospital had a previous owner, Continuum Health Partners Inc.

-  How were the losses explained when they occurred, and what was the rationale for  borrowing from restricted endowment as a response, instead of, for example, direct efforts to minimize losses or increase capital and revenue?

Note that the article implied that when SUNY acquired LICH, it acquired some very valuable real estate.  Why did the previous management of LICH not consider selling off some of this real estate to resolve its debts?

-  Did mismanagement of the hospital lead to excess losses, and did borrowing funds from the principle of the hospital's endowment to offset these losses amounted to more mismanagement?
 

Meanwhile, a second even more bizarre story about another New York City hospital almost simultaneously got media attention.

The Resident Heiress

The case first made it into the media in 2012, when the tabloid New York Post reported,

Beth Israel Medical Center milked reclusive copper heiress Huguette Clark for more than $13 million in fees, donations and even a priceless painting during her 20-year stay as a patient — and greedy executives angled for $125 million more, her relatives allege in shocking new court filings over Clark’s estate.

The alleged shakedown was illuminated in an e-mail in which hospital board member and former CEO Dr. Robert Newman referred to Clark as 'the biggest bucks contributing potential we’ve ever had,' according to court papers.
He told a colleague her 'potential has been overwhelming[ly] unrealized.'

At one point, he suggested to Clark that she pay nearly one-third of her estimated $400 million fortune to keep the now-shuttered Beth Israel North on the Upper East Side open so she could keep living in the room she had refused to leave for 15 years despite being in good physical health, the papers allege.

But instead of addressing Clark’s crippling anxiety, hospital honchos played on her fears, engaging in 'a concentrated effort, orchestrated at the highest board and executive levels,' to get her money, court documents obtained by The Post allege.

Clark’s death last year at age 104 set off a battle over her estate. Her distant relatives claim lawyer Wallace Bock, accountant Irving Kamsler, private-duty nurse Hadassah Peri and the Beth Israel administrators manipulated the feeble Clark for her money.

The nurse, who received cash and gifts from Clark, stands to inherit nearly $34 million and Clark’s priceless doll collection in the now-disputed will. Beth Israel is to get $1 million.

The Paris-born Clark inherited her money from her father, William, a rail and mining baron and former US senator whose wealth rivaled the Rockefellers’.

She went to Beth Israel North in 1991, when she was 85, after a doctor found her emaciated and ill in one of her three sprawling Fifth Avenue apartments.

She spent the last two decades of her life in dismal hospital rooms with the shades drawn and door shut even though there was 'no medical basis for keeping her' past the first few months, documents show.

Clark was 'the perfect patient' for the hospital, her relatives charge, noting, 'She required no medical care, possessed enormous wealth, paid over $800 a day for her room, and became progressively more dependent on the hospital.'

'Beth Israel had a plan to subtly, but ever so persistently, court Huguette for the purpose of garnering gifts and ultimately do a will in favor of the hospital,' court papers claim.

This case also seems to be about wealthy donors and hospital executives.  Yet what makes it most bizarre are the circumstance of Ms Clark's hospital stay.  As a former intern, resident, fellow, and teaching hospital attending, I can attest that most hospital administrators are concerned, if not obsessed, with discharging patients quickly.  Hospital stays are currently paid by most insurers according to the patients' diagnoses, but not their length of stay.  Long stays cost hospitals money.  Furthermore, unnecessarily long stays use up resources that could better serve acutely ill and injured patients.  Yet Ms Clark stayed an astounding 20 plus years, without any obvious medical rationale.  No hospital official contested the fact that Ms Clark stayed that long in the NY Post article.

Furthermore, in a 2013 New York Times article, the hospital's lawyer, defending a parallel attempt to recover the money donated to the hospital, wrote

 Beth Israel had provided Mrs. Clark with 'a well-attended home where she was able to live out her days in security, relative good health and comfort, and with the pleasures of human company.' Besides, he said, the amount of money she gave to Beth Israel was “not very large considering her vast wealth.”

Furthermore, a member of the Beth Israel fund-raising staff wrote in a memo disclosed during litigation,

 She was well enough by then to go home to her spacious apartment at Fifth Avenue and 72nd Street, overlooking Central Park, Ms. [Cynthia L] Cromer said, but 'she asked if she might stay in the hospital longer: she feels comfortable and safe, and her apartment is being renovated.'

Never mind that the fundamental mission of the hospital is to provide acute care for the sick and injured, not to provide comfortable retirement housing. But hospital managers are apparently on record acknowledging that the hospital was basically providing Ms Clark with services that are normally available in a retirement community, not services that acute care hospitals normally provide anyone   There is no evidence that the hospital ever provided similar services to any other patients. 

The obvious mystery, then, is

- why no one at the hospital, no doctor, nurse, or manager, or no visitor, regulator, accrediting agency, insurer ever questioned why the hospital was providing a long-term residence to a former patient?

No answer to the question has appeared in any coverage I have seen of this case, including a September, 2013,.NY Times followup article on the occasion of the case nearing trial. 

In the absence of a creditable explanation for this strange distortion of the hospital mission,

- is there any other conclusion than that its purpose was to extract a large amount of money from a vulnerable, rich, but no longer acutely ill former patient?

This would suggest an unusual but monumentally unethical kind of hospital mismanagement.

So we have two recent stories about major, unusual, apparently severe mismanagement by hospital executives.  These stories were reported as if they were independent.

However, buried in the original NY Post article, but unmentioned in either of the major NY Times articles, however, was a hint of how this case and that above of the purloined inheritance appeared to be linked.

The Hidden Hospital System

The NY Post article referred thus to the Beth Israel CEO who allegedly pushed Ms Clark for contributions,

 Newman, former CEO of Continuum Health Partners, Beth Israel’s parent organization, took the unusual step of offering to help Clark complete a will so 'some faceless bureaucrat of the government' wouldn’t get his hands on her estate, court papers say.

Quick Watson, did you see that?

Continuum Health Partners was the "parent organization" of Beth Israel Hospital during at least some of the time Ms Clark was in residence there.  Continuum Health Partners also was the "previous owner" of Long Island College Hospital during at least some of the time it apparently was suffering large losses and its endowment was being depleted.  So were both these stories really about the same organization, the same hospital system?

Digging a little further, per its own LinkedIn page,

 Continuum Health Partners, Inc. was formed in 1997 as a partnership of three venerable institutions — Beth Israel Medical Center, St. Luke's Hospital, and Roosevelt Hospital.

So while the hospital system did not exist when Ms Clark first entered Beth Israel Hospital, the heiress' "care" was under the control of the organization apparently from 1997 to the day she died.

Furthermore, as noted in a 2011 Chronicle of Higher Education article, available from Innovative Resources Group Inc,

 If there was a honeymoon after the merger of Long Island College Hospital, in Brooklyn, with Continuum Health Partners, in New York in 1998, few remember it. The bickering began early and dragged on for years, but divorce didn’t seem inevitable until the doctors went public.

So the hospital system called Continuum Health Partners took over Long Island College Hospital in 1998 and held it for 13 years.  Furthermore, apparently LICH was part of Continuum Health Partners during the time when its losses rose and the Othmer bequest was depleted.  For example, from the CHE article,

  Several physicians told a crowd gathered outside the hospital’s entrance in 2008 that Continuum had withheld money from the 150-year-old institution, needlessly cutting patient services and endangering the hospital’s future.

Also in 2008, the Brooklyn Heights Blog reported this response to a question about finances from the Continuum Health Partners CEO, Stanley Bazenoff,

 LICH faces an immediate fiscal crisis. Unless action is taken quickly, he said, LICH will not have cash on hand to meet payrolls and other current expenses. He ascribed LICH’s problem to three factors. First, the hospital carries a heavy debt burden–approximately $150 million in long-term bonds financed through the New York State Dormitory Authority and $25 million in short-term commercial paper–which results in annual debt service (including interest and amortization) cost of approximately $22 million. Second, LICH has an operating deficit, presently about $40 million on an annual basis,...

Denis Hamill, a columnist for the New York Daily News, made this accusation in a February, 2013, editorial:

Under Continuum, the once-profitable LICH ran up $300 million in debt from pure administrative malpractice. And then Brezenoff brokered the smelly SUNY Downstate merger, with state taxpayers absorbing the $300 million debt.

So it certainly looks like there is an argument that Continuum Health Partners, under its CEO, Stanley Bazenoff, was responsible for the manipulation of pseudo-patient and rich heiress Hughette Clark to secure a large donation, and the nearly simultaneous depletion of Long Island College Hospital's finances, including a large bequest that was supposed to be untouchable.

Not surprisingly, Mr Bazenoff, described by Mr Hamill as

a ruthless powerbroker ... whose nickname at LICH is Darth Vader 

and

a quintessential member of what muckraker Jack Newfield called The Permanent Government of New York  

also seems to have gotten rich in his position as leader of Continuum Health Partners, along with his other top managers.   The blog LICH Watch found these results from the system's 2009 IRS 990 report,

here are some highlights, figures for Continuum employees who, hm, earned more than a million dollars for the year:

Chandra Sen, MD, $2,109,204
Stanley Brezenoff, $2,014,413
Kathryn C. Meyer, Esq. $1,049,807
John Collura, $1,307,556
Gail Donovan, $1,365,354

 A 2011 New York Post article stated,

 Stan Brezenoff, CEO of Continuum Health Partners, overseeing such hospitals as Beth Israel, St. Luke’s and Roosevelt, pulled in about $3.5 million. 

 So this leads to yet more mysteries, first about the individual cases when viewed as occurring within one large hospital system:

-  Why were Long Island College Hospital's finances addressed as if it were an independent entity, when it was in fact just a subsidiary of Continuum Health Partners? 

-  Why was Continuum Health Partners role in the hospital's enlarging debt and depleting endowment not discussed?

Similarly,

-  Why was the bizarre treatment of Hughette Clark attributed to "Beth Israel executives," but not Continuum Health Executives, when Beth Israel was also just a subsidiary of Continuum Health? 

Then there is the larger mystery,

-  Why have these two cases been discussed as completely independent, when they appear to be part of a pattern of conduct by Continuum Health Partners management?

Summary

While we continue to see cases, some amazingly bizarre, suggesting mismanagement and unethical management of hospitals and hospital systems, there seems to be an amazing lack of curiosity about how they occurred and what their implications may be.  This lack of curiosity is so profound that no one seems to have noticed that two vivid and strange cases getting prominent media notice in the same city and the same time involved the same large hospital system. 

Health care organizations seem to become ever larger.  Such enlarging organizations can concentrate their power, dominate their "markets," and hence increase their revenues and the compensation of their top hired managers.  Without any countervailing force, they push seemingly inexorably towards oligopoly and then monopoly.

Furthermore, the cases of the purloined bequest and the resident heiress show that ever larger organizations with ever more complex structures are ever better at hiding the accountability of their top hired managers.  We have previously noted, e.g. a case in which a subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline pleaded guilty to crimes involving production of adulterated drugs, thus shielding GSK and its management from responsibility, how subsidiaries of large corporations may plead guilty to crimes, thus absolving their parent organizations and its managers of any blame.

In the current cases, it seems that somehow a large health care system was able to avoid accountability by letting its component hospitals appear to be independent.  Yet it is the larger system that was booking the revenue and making millionaires out of its hired managers.  This seems to show how concentration of power into ever more complex organizations can be used to enhance the anechoic effect, making mismanagement and those accountable for it ever more obscure.

As we have said until blue in our collective faces, if we do not hold the real leaders of health care accountable for their actions and the actions of their organizations on their watches, we can expect continued misbehavior, and hence continued health care dysfunction.  

It's appropriate to conclude with this, a video of Jeremy Brett in A Scandal in Bohemia, from the first season of the show as first shown on PBS.

The Long Con - "Charitable" Hospitals Make Multimillionaires out of Their CEOs

The CEOs of ostensibly charitable hospitals founded to serve the poor continue to become rich.  

The latest reminders are in two articles from Maryland, from DelMarVaNow, and from the Baltimore Sun,.and one from the Boston Globe.

All this diligent reporting showed multimillion dollar executive compensation,  as usual not justified by evidence or logic, but also how executive compensation is becoming divorced from the ostensible charitable mission of non-profit hospitals.  

Most Hospital CEOs are Paid a Lot

So jin Maryland, we found via DelMarVaNow,

Peninsula Regional Medical Center paid its top executive and her immediate predecessor a total of $2.37 million in compensation in 2011 as the nonprofit hospital gained millions of dollars in profit.

In particular,

 The analysis shows that R. Alan Newberry was the third-highest paid hospital chief in Maryland, even though he has not run PRMC since 2009. In the year after formally stepping down from the hospital’s top job, Newberry received $1.57 million, about $600,000 more than he had while still working full time.

The Baltimore Sun summarized compensation given to multiple executives,

 Eleven executives earning seven-figure compensation packages including salary, bonus, retirement and other pay saw their total pay rise from as little as 0.13 percent to as much as 308 percent in the fiscal year that ended in 2012, according to tax filings. Another executive earning more than $1 million saw a pay cut.

In particular,

 The state's highest-compensated hospital executive that fiscal year was Kenneth A. Samet, the CEO of the 10-hospital MedStar Health system, who earned $6.3 million. More than half — $3.5 million — was money earned in a supplemental retirement plan during his 23 years of service. He won't get the money until he retires. His base pay was $1.2 million, and he received $1.5 million as a bonus and incentives.

The other top five highest-paid executives in Maryland are James Xinis, CEO at Calvert Memorial Hospital in Prince Frederick; Ronald A. Peterson, CEO of the Johns Hopkins Health Center Corp.; Robert A. Chrencik, CEO of the University of Maryland Medical System; and Thomas Mullen, CEO of Mercy Medical Center.

Xinis saw his compensation package jump 307.8 percent to $3.5 million, $2.8 million of which was a required distribution of vested retirement funds from a plan he begin contributing to in 2003, the hospital said in a statement. Xinis has served as CEO for 26 years and plans to retire in the next 18 months, the hospital said. His base salary in fiscal 2012 was $309,557.

Peterson, who oversees six hospitals, earned a $3.5 million compensation package. Peterson's 86.5 percent pay increase largely reflected pension benefits he'd earned during 40 years at Hopkins. His annual base salary increased about $49,500 to $1.1 million in fiscal 2012.

Chrencik, whose system has 12 hospitals, earned about $2.3 million. Chrencik's total pay grew 23.4 percent. Mercy's Mullen saw his pay rise 24 percent to $1.6 million for the fiscal year ending in 2012.

The one CEO earning more than $1 million who saw his compensation fall was Edward D. Miller, who retired in June 2012 as CEO of Johns Hopkins Medicine and dean of the university's medical school. His reported pay dropped to just over $1 million in fiscal 2012 from nearly $2.3 million the prior year, when he took a one-time retirement payout.

Also,

According to Saint Agnes tax filings, [CEO Bonnie] Phipps received $1.9 million in the 2012 fiscal year, 4.4 percent more compensation than a year earlier.

 Per the Boston Globe, local hospital executives also did really well

Chief executives at the Boston area’s largest nonprofit teaching hospitals drew pay packages of $1 million to $2.1 million in 2011, including salaries, bonuses, and compensation such as health and life insurance and retirement benefits.

Topping the list locally was Gary L. Gottlieb, chief executive of Partners HealthCare System, the state’s largest hospital and physicians organization, who received total compensation of $2.1 million in 2011, according to federal tax documents released Thursday by the nonprofits.

And,

The presidents of Partners-owned Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s hospitals also drew seven-figure packages in 2011, with Peter L. Slavin at Mass. General receiving a total of $1.7 million and Elizabeth G. Nabel at Brigham and Women’s a total of $1.9 million.

Also,

Tufts Medical Center reported that Ellen M. Zane, who served as chief executive through September 2011, had total pay of $1.6 million that year.

Eric J. Beyer, who took over from Zane in October, had total compensation of $744,722 that included pay for work as chief executive and at his previous job as president of the Tufts Medical Center Physicians Organization.

James Mandell, chief executive at Boston Children’s Hospital, was paid a total of $1.5 million in 2011. That was down from the $2 million he earned the prior year when he received two separate incentive awards, according to a hospital spokeswoman. Mandell plans to retire next month and will be succeeded by Sandra Fenwick, the hospital’s president and chief operating officer.

Total compensation for Boston Medical Center chief executive Kate Walsh was listed at nearly $1.4 million in 2011, an increase from $1.3 million in 2010.

At Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, chief executive Edward J. Benz Jr. received total compensation of nearly $1.3 million in 2011, up from $1.1 million in 2010.

Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center paid three different top executives in 2011.

Eric Buehrens, who served as interim chief executive from February to October, drew total compensation of just over $1 million for that role and other executive jobs.

The Justification for this Pay is Stereotyped (and not Supported by Logic or Evidence)

The Usual Talking Points

The articles in combination provided the usual talking points as justification.  It seems nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same arguments, thus suggesting they are talking points, possibly crafted as a public relations ploy.   We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, here here, here, here, and here..   

They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant.

As we have noted before, there is little evidence in support of these talking points.  What evidence there is on the topic suggests there is no real free market in interchangeable CEOs, and that CEOs are not very mobile, especially not across different kinds of organizations (look here).  There is little evidence that hospital (or other health care) executives are particularly brilliant, or any more brilliant than multitudes of physicians, nurses, and other health care professionals who work hard to make their institutions run.

True to form, the reporting from Maryland and Boston found that defenders of executive pay cited the talking points, but without any further logic or evidence. 

Competition

Re PRMC (from DelMarVaNow),

 'We’ve looked at about 17 like institutions. Eight are smaller than we are; eight are larger. Every hospital is different, so you have to always take into account there’s some variation, but we’ve always stayed in the middle. Our goal has been to stay in that 60 percent level as far as compensation goes,' said Martin Neat, chairman of PRMC’s board of directors, which oversees executives’ salaries.­

Note that in this case, no justification was provided for constantly setting the CEOs pay above the median.


Re Maryland, via the Baltimore Sun

 Hospitals argue that they have to offer competitive compensation to attract talent to run a complicated business.

Re Maryland and particularly UMMS, via the Sun,

 The medical institutions say they hire independent consultants and look at the pay of executives at comparable health systems when making their decisions.

Also,

UMMS hospital executives are compensated in line with national benchmarks,' [UMMS spokeswoman Mary Lynn] Carver said.

Note that there was no justification for the comparability of these institutions, or why a national versus regional comparison was made.

Retention

Re PRMC

 Above all, PRMC’s board of directors seeks to ensure that the hospital attracts and retains the best leaders.

Note that there was no evidence given that current leaders might leave were their compensation reduced.

 Brilliance

Re PRMC,

[Board Chairman Neat]  added: 'These are high-paid positions, but these are very capable people who could go elsewhere.'

Re Maryland, from the Baltimore Sun

 Executives need to understand everything from the latest health technologies to regulatory changes, including health reform.

So do doctors and nurses, so why do they not not get similar pay?

Also,

 [Carmela Coyle, CEO of the Maryland Hospital Association, said,] 'Hospital executives are in charge of incredibly complex organizations,' she said. 'They are organizations that are open 24 hours a day and are highly regulated. These are really difficult, difficult jobs'.

Note again the lack of comparison with the doctors and nurses who must staff the hospitals 24 hours a day, and make difficult decisions while caring for patients with sometimes life-threatening conditions.  How often does a hospital CEO get a call in the middle of the night, and how often does it require a decision in a life-and-death situation?

Re Mercy Medical Center,

 'As a result of Mr. Mullen's leadership, vision and skillful stewardship, Mercy has been an economic engine for the city, infusing additional jobs into the local economy,' the hospital said in a statement.

When in doubt, use the v (for visionary) word.  Note that this begs the questions of how many other people were responsible for the economic benefits, and whether such benefits, rather than, say ability to provide good care to patients, should be the main consideration.

Should Brilliance be Measured by Revenue?

At best, some defenders of high CEO pay seem to argue that the main measure of CEO brilliance ought to be their hospitals' financial performance. For example, the DelMarvaNow article included,

Fiscal health is one of the most important considerations in determining [new CEO Peggy] Naleppa's pay, [board chairman] Neat said. 

Also, he was quoted,

'There's no question that the financial performance of the institution is going to affect what you're going to pay', Neat said.

While,

Nationwide, hospital boards subscribe to a similar philosophy.  Financial health was cited by 100 percent of multi-hospital organizations in a 2006 survey as a factor in determining bosses' incentive plans.

Similarly, the Baltimore Sun quoted Dr Stephen F Jencks, "who serves on the board of the cost review commission,"

executives should be judged by whether they are running cost-efficient organizations

However, CEO pay seems to increase even at financially challenged institutions,  as the Baltimore Sun noted,

The CEO pay question — always a hot-button issue — is generating debate again this year after a state panel spurned a push by hospitals for higher rates, instead approving smaller increases and calling on them to do more to curb expenses. Hospitals have sought rate increases in each of the past three years, and this year at least one Baltimore-area hospital responded with layoffs in an effort to trim labor costs.

So,

'If they are laying off staff and decreasing what they invest in the community and executive compensation is increasing, that is a real question,' said Jessica Curtis, project director of the hospital accountability project at Community Catalyst, a national advocacy group that promotes wider access to affordable health care.

Even if one accepts that the compensation of leaders of organizations that take care of sick and injured patients ought to mainly depend on the brilliance of their leadership as measured by how much money the organizations make, rather than the quality of that care, it is not clear that all these leaders are brilliant in that sense.

The Charitable Mission and CEO Compensation

Essentially all US non-profit hospitals and hospital systems have a history of a charitable mission to improve the health of their patients and communities, even if that means taking care of poor people who cannot pay for these services.  Nearly all justify their legal status as non-profit corporations by stating this mission. 

For example, Peninsula Regional Medical Center, the main subject of the DelMarVaNow article, describes its mission thus in its US tax filing,

Peninsula Regional Medical Center is a not-for-profit 501 (c) 3 non-stock corporation founded in 1897 to serve the health care needs of the community.  The Hospital's primary purpose is to provide the highest [sic] primary, secondary, and selected tertiary health care services to residents of and visitors to the Mid-Delmarva Peninsula in a competent, compassionate, and cost effective manner designed to elicit a high degree of consumer satisfaction.  The Hospital's mission is to improve the health of the communities we serve....

Yet it appears that this mission is honored mainly in the breach, at least when it comes to CEO compensation. 

The DelMarVaNow article emphasized that hospitals' charitable functions are not seen as relevant by hospital boards when setting CEO compensation,

Despite the nonprofit status of the organizations they oversee, hospital boards don't appear to put weight toward the amount of free medical services and community outreach activities, good deeds collectively known as charity care, [executive vice president of Integrated Healthcare Strategies Kevin] Talbot

Also,

The head of the consulting firm that helps PRMC's board establish [current CEO] Naleppa's pay said community benefit shouldn't be part of the equation.

'In my over 25 years of consulting on hospital compensation, I have never seen community benefit used as a factor in determining executive pay,' Rian Yaffe said.  'Community benefit has nothing to do with how difficult a hospital is to manage and lead.'

However, community benefit is the mission of the hospital, and is justification for most US hospitals' non-profit status, which allows them to escape certain kinds of taxation, and for donors to make charitable, tax-advantaged contributions to the hospitals.  

The Baltimore Sun listed financial but not charitable performance as a justification for the compensation of a particular executive, the CEO of Johns Hopkins Medical Center, who is

'held responsible for stringent qualitative measures,'  in such areas as financial performance, patient safety and service excellence, [Johns Hopkins] spokeswoman Kim Hoppe said in a statement.

When asked by the Sun to comment, the advocacy group Community Catalyst stated

One of the factors that should be considered, it says, is the role of non-profit hospitals in the community and in providing charity care. 

Meanwhile, while the hospitals gain advantages from ostensibly focused on the mission of providing community care and benefit, not only are there leaders not given incentives to uphold this mission, they are explicitly compared to leaders of for-profit organizations who have no such missions, and who are primarily tasked with increasing short term revenue in this era of "financialization." 

In the Baltimore Sun,

Hospitals note that they compete with private sector businesses where their executives could choose to work instead.

Again, as noted above, there is little evidence that top hired managers are really that mobile, and less that a manager from one sector, e.g., non-profit hospitals, would be in great demand in another, e.g., a for-profit corporation.

The Boston Globe noted an argument made that implied no one should complain about how much non-profit hospital executives make, since executives of for-profit corporations make even more.

 'In a big successful teaching hospital, it’s very rare to see anything less than $1 million in total compensation for the chief executive, and $1.5 million to $2 million is the norm,' [managing director of consulting firm Compensation Resources Paul R] Dorf said. 'Executives at publicly traded pharma or medical device companies can make 10 times as much.'

So if there is little evidence for the mobility of top hired managers, there is less for the desirability of managers of non-profit hospitals as heads of large pharmaceutical or medical device companies.  But furthermore, in trying to justify, albeit illogically, outsize CEO compensation, the defenders of this compensation have provided evidence that the leaders and stewards of non-profit hospitals may no longer care about the hospitals' fundamental mission.  This suggests that hospitals' overt declarations of their mission, especially when used to obtain more donations and tax benefits, may amount to the ethical equivalent of a "long con," that is, a long-term confidence scheme.


Summary

While F Scott Fitzgerald noted that the very rich are different from you and me, it may now be more appropriate to say that top hired managers are very different from you and me.  Again and again we see that they play by very different sets of rules than do other people who work in health care.  Notably, while they often emphasize cost cutting, and may be quick to lay off or outsource other employees, their compensation increases year by year no matter how well their organizations are doing.  While other employees, increasingly now including doctors as well as other health care professionals, have to answer to the hired managers, the hired managers only answer to boards of directors or trustees who often act like their cronies, perhaps because they are often also current or retired hired managers.

Hired managers are subject to incentives that seem designed not to improve patients' and the public's health, but at best to improve the short-term revenue of health care organizations, and at worst to increase the wealth of hired managers.  Such perverse incentives risk promoting ill-considered, mission-hostile, or even corrupt management.  The sorts of people who aspire to be hired managers in such conditions are likely not the sort of people one would expect to really advance the health of patients or of the population.

As a first step to restoring health care leadership to some state of reasonable accountability and responsibility, we need to challenge the rules that only hired managers play by.  It would be nice to see articles in the media about health care CEO compensation that at least attempt to question the usual talking points.  All of us could think about how we could challenge our local million dollar plus hospital CEOs to justify why they should be treated so differently from all other hospital employees.

Since it seems that many hospitals no longer fit at least the spirit of the definition of not-for-profit organizations, even though they use this designation for financial advantage, we need policies to encourage them to uphold their mission, and that provide negative consequences if they do not. 

Should We Cry for Non-Profit Hospital System CEOs Paid Less than For-Profit CEOs?

Two recent articles (here and here) in Modern Healthcare providing an update on the compensation of CEOs of non-profit hospital systems raised new questions.

The CEOs' Compensation

The first article documented the rich compensation of the top paid CEOs of non-profit US hospital systems.  A summary of their total compensation:

-  Donald Faulk (now retired), Central Georgia Health System - $8 million
-  George Halvorson, Kaiser Permanente - $7.9 million
-  Jeffrey Romoff, UPMC - $6.1 million
 -  Pat Fry, Sutter Health - $5.2 million
-  Gregory Beier (retired), Novant Health  - $5.1 million
-  Dr Steve Safyer, Montefiore Medical Center - $5 million
-  David Bernd, Sentara - $4.6 million

The Usual Talking Points

The articles in combination provided the usual talking points as justification for this compensation.   We have noted that nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same talking points.   We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, here here, here and here.   They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant.

So true to form, we found in the Modern Healthcare articles these justifications of the executives multimillion dollar pay.

Competition

In general,

In interviews, health system directors and executives at the systems where these top-paid executives work defended the compensation packages as necessary to remain competitive....

Re UPMC

UPMC spokeswoman Susan Manko described his [that is, Romoff's] pay as competitive for an institution of UPMC's size and complexity. 

Re Novant

Novant spokeswoman Kati Everett said Novant follows IRS rules that call for pay to be compared against the market....

Re Sutter

[Sutter Health board of trustees member and chair of the compensation committee Andy] Pansini said the Sutter board set the CEO's salary halfway between the lowest and the highest amount he could earn elsewhere.

Also,

He said Sutter's board relies heavily on consultants to compare Fry's compensation against the market.

Retention

 Re Sentara

'Mr Bernd's compensation takes into account his 40-year tenure of leadership at Sentara, with nearly 20 serving as the organization's top executives.

Brilliance

Re Novant

[Novant spokeswoman Kati Everett said] 'At Novant Health, we recognize (that) our responsibility to serve our community depends on the caliber of talent in our workforce, our leadership group....'

Re Sentara

[CEO Bernd's] 'pay reflects his experience, expertise....'

Re Sutter

[Pansini] defended [CEO] Fry's compensation as reasonable and necessary to meet Sutter's strategic goals by hiring a skilled executive team. 

Explicit Comparison to For-Profit Corporations

The articles also introduced one new element.  Some defenders of non-profit hospital CEO compensation explicitly argued that should take into account compensation of for-profit CEOs.

This argument was made by "Jill Horwitz, a law professor at the University of California at Los Angeles,' who had "defended paying not-for-profit healthcare executives market rates."

She also noted that not-for-profit systems have to compete with the for-profit sector for top talent. 'This idea that people should be donating their labor is a misunderstanding of charity.'

Defenders of CEO compensation at specific health systems also made similar points.  For example, a Kaiser Permanente spokesman explicitly compared his CEO's pay to that given to CEOs of for-profit health plans,

Kaiser spokesman Won Ha, in a written statement, said Halvorson's pay falls short of the average compensation of $14 million, not including option exercises, earned by CEOs of the 12 largest for-profit healthcare systems, which had average 2011 revenue of $37 billion.

'Compensation paid to senior management is substantially less than that of many for-profit health (plans),...'

Also, re Sutter,

[board committee chair Pansini noted that when comparing his CEO's pay against the market] That comparison includes other executives of similar not-for-profit health systems, and to a lesser degree, of for-profit systems.

 Summary: An Extension, but Still no Clear Justification for the Talking Points


The talking points to explain executive compensation in health care are used again and again.  They never seem to be publicly challenged.  However, they should raise some obvious questions.

The argument about competition raises several obvious questions.  Why should the top hired managers' pay be only compared to other top managers, and not explicitly to other employees?  Even if the comparison is restricted to other top managers, how can they be used for those at the top of the pay scale for non-profit hospital system CEOs?  How these CEOs' compensation could be dubbed merely competitive, much less "halfway between the lowest and highest amount he could earn elsewhere," is not clear.

The retention argument begs the questions of whether any of these managers is really likely to leave, whether they really would be attractive to other organizations at the same or even higher pay, and whether it would really be difficult to find replacements.

The brilliance argument raises the question of how brilliance is defined.  Given that it is almost unheard of for a fan of current compensation practices to dub any top manager anything less than brilliant, the obvious question is how can CEOs, like the children of Lake Woebegone, all be above average? 

 Furthermore, the talking points seem to be in the process of extension, which should raise even more questions.

Defenders of CEO pay, usually "spokespeople" or members of boards of trustees, often cite the need for "competitive" pay.  They usually are not clear about with whom they are competing.  Now it seems to be more popular to say that non-profit health care organizations are competing with for-profit corporations, despite the ostensible difference in their natures.  Non-profits are supposed to have a charitable nature and function, to have some sort of mission that serves the greater good.  To support that apparently benevolent purpose, in the US they are exempt from certain taxes, are are able to receive charitable contributions which in turn earn deductions for their givers.  For-profit corporations are in business ostensibly for their owners. 


In addition, by now asserting that the non-profit CEOs should be likened to the CEOs of for-profit corporations, the expanded talking points highlight questions that have been raised about how these hired managers are paid. We have previously discussed some pithy critiques of American practices of executive compensation (look here and here.)

CEO compensation as a multiple of the pay of the average worker has risen 10-fold since the 1960s (see this chart). As a consequence, the top 1% and 0.1% of the US income distribution is increasingly and disproportionately made up of executives, that is hired managers, (see the recent article by Bivens and Mishel[1] for a summary).  Per the article, the income of top corporate executives has grown even faster than that of other members of the top 0.1%.  It seems evident that these rates of growth cannot be explained by increases in the financial performance of their companies.  Furthermore, while it appears that compensation of US health care corporate executives has grown as fast as their brethren, there is no data that US health care has improved at anything like a similar rate.  It may have hardly improved at all.  A recent JAMA article is just the latest example of studies showing that US health is lagging that of other developed countries, although the US spends far more per capita on health care.(2)     

Furthermore, there is more and more criticism about how the compensation of top hired managers is set.  Steve Denning's blog  post in Forbes summarized a 2012 Harvard Business Review article(3) suggesting that "market-based" compensation schemes mistake top managers for innovative entrepreneurs, when they are mainly simply "bureaucrats"; reward managers for luck rather than skill; and is "inversely related to shareholder returns."

Finally, Elson and Ferrere critiqued the mechanics of how compensation is set.  In particular, while boards of directors may attend to data on compensation of CEOs at other, supposedly comparable corporations, they almost always "choose a package that is in the 50th, 75th, or 90th percentile of their target peer group.  Targeting levels below the 50th percentile is rarely, if ever done."  Thus, boards nearly always act as if their CEO is above average, while by definition, most CEOs cannot be above average.  Why do boards commit this folly?  The authors postulated that suggesting the CEO is less than average "may raise concerns over the executive's position within the company...."  Perhaps boards also fear that labeling the CEO below average may be an admission of below average governance. 

Desai suggested that the perverse incentives created by current schemes to compensate managers were a major cause of the 2008 financial meltdown.  As Dennings wrote,

despite the constraints to change, the overcompensation of the C-suite and the financial sector is not sustainable. It causes serious misallocation of capital and talent, repeated governance crises, rising income inequality and an overall decline of the US economy. It obviously cannot continue, if only because, as Margaret Thatcher used to say in a different context, 'Sooner or later you run out of other people’s money'

Clearly, in the health care context, the results could be even worse.  Perverse executive compensation could not only lead to misallocation of capital and talent in health care, it could lead to bad health care decisions that could harm patients' and the public's health.  However, there seems to be almost no discussion of, much less research about, much less policy changes addressing perverse incentives for health care managers and their likely ruinously bad effects on people and patients.

Such discussion and research is a prerequisite to true health care reform, which would require such policy changes.

Meanwhile, I hope at least the next time huge compensation of some health care managers is announced, someone asks the next set of questions after the usual talking points are made.  

Roy M. Poses MD in Health Care Renewal

References
1.  Bivens J, Mishel L. The pay of corporate executives and financial professionals as evidence of rents in top 1 percent incomes.  J Econ Perspect 2013; 27: 57-78.
2. US Burden of Disease Collaborative.  The state of US health, 1990-2010 burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors.  JAMA 2013; 310: 591-608.  Link here.
3. Desai M. The incentive bubble.  Harvard Business Review, March 2012. 

Guest Post: the Slow Grind of Justice

 Health Care Renewal presents a guest blog by Steve Lucas, a retired businessman who formerly worked in real estate and construction who has a long standing interest in business ethics, and has long observed the health care scene.

The March 14, 2013 Akron Beacon Journal print edition highlights what I am sure Mercy Medical Center hopes is the end of a long legal battle with Aultman Health Foundation. 

Cheryl Powell writes in "High court throws out appeal by Aultman" highlights the Ohio Supreme Courts dismissal of Aultman’s suit brought in regards to a 2010 court ruling that Aultman pay Mercy $6.1 million for unfair business practices. 

A review of that legal action can be found on this Health Care Renewal post.

The legal battle centers on 'secret ´bonuses paid to select brokers for switching employers from other insurance plans to Aultman’s insurance company, AultCare.

Aultman Hospital is AultCare’s only in-network hospital in Canton.'

It is important to remember that AultCare is an aggressive for-profit insurance company.

At the end of the two-month trial in Stark County Common Please Court, jurors decided Aultman should pay Mercy more than $6.1 million in damages for engaging n a pattern of corrupt activity by influencing brokers with money.

'Evidence during the trial showed that for a period of time, brokers weren’t allowed to disclose the payments to anyone, even the clients they represented.

Aultman officials have said the confidentiality requirement was dropped in 2004, well before Mercy filed its lawsuit.

We see an all too familiar behavior pattern: someone sensing that he or she is about to be caught drops an activity and then feigns innocence for our past transgressions. How often have we seen a drug company sign a consent agreement only then to return to court to sigh another consent agreement? How often are we told that an activity was committed by a low level sales person and that person is no longer with the company?

Aultman has continued to criticize the case Mercy filed, calling it a waste of resource for the non-profit health-care organizations.

'We have always felt that this case was not positive for our community, that resources were shifted in a way that was not beneficial to the community' [the attorney representing Aultman, Allen] Schulman said. 'I don’t think that it serves the community well.'

[ Mercy President and Chief Executive Thomas] Cecconi said Mercy felt an obligation to fight Aultman’s business practices for the community’s sake.

Conclusion

Once again we find the use of the legal system perverted by one party in an effort to gain a business advantage over another entity.

Aultman has used its non-profit status to shield the activities of a for-profit insurance subsidiary.  Perhaps someone thought that no one would sue a large non-profit hospital for the actions of the subsidiary.

Aultman used the tired old refrain that “we don’t do that anymore” as a defense for past business practices that garnered questionable profits. This after the fact admission does not absolve them of responsibility for those actions.

When all else fails Aultman uses the appeal that it reflects badly on the community. It really does not matter that they were the ones who engaged in this activity. Additionally they make the claim this will result in a decline in resources available when they profited from the original activity.

These are old concepts to HCR readers. The use of the legal system, from law suits being filed against those who would blow the whistle, to grinding out appeals to bleed a person or organization dry, all in an effort to protect a questionable or even illegal activity. In this case there is still the issue of Mercy’s legal fees involved in Aultman’s appeal.

Smaller markets are seeing a consolidation of hospitals and medical practices. The opportunity for one party to take advantage of this is growing as patients and doctors are presented with limited opportunities to seek appropriate medical care. When the hospital owns the insurance company, and your care will be dictated by the policy available through only one company, the opportunity for abuse has to be acknowledged.

Mercy has begun to grow again by offering the community a less corporate medical experience. Interestingly, Mercy and Aultman have collaborated on securing scarce oncology drugs. It appears some doctors still feel it is about caring for the patient, and less about loyalty to a corporate logo.

Steve Lucas

More Signs of Organized Resistance? - Proposed Legislation for More Hospital Leadership Accountability

This year we note the beginning of action against the power of large health care organizations lead by hired executives and cronies who seem to put their self-interest and self-enrichment ahead of patients' and the people's health.  In 2013 we noted no confidence votes by medical school faculty (here), and university faculty (here) against academic leaders perceived as putting their power and wealth ahead of core values, actions by a state governor (here) and a big city mayor (here) against local health care systems perceived as putting their executives' enrichment ahead of their services to patients, and a union labor action (here) against a health care system perceived as putting executive enrichment ahead of adequate health insurance for low level employees.  We have posted about numerous examples of hospital (and other health care organization) executives receiving compensation far out of proportion to any realistic measure of their organizations' performance or positive effects on patients' or the public's health, and seemingly skimmed off the top of these organizations' budgets.

Now Modern Healthcare has reported about a bill in the California legislature aimed at supposedly not for profit hospitals that put money ahead of patients:

Officials with the California Nurses Association say the proposed law—AB 975—is an attempt to bring more accountability to money-making hospitals that use tax exemptions to turn tidy profits and give hefty salaries to executives.

Furthermore,

 Charles Idelson, spokesman for the California Nurses Association, said many profitable tax-exempt hospitals have lost the public's trust in recent years by making profits their top mission and paying salaries that allow executives to buy yachts while 'chipping away' at less-profitable services for women, children, the poor and mentally ill.

'What this bill does is, it really is an effort to increase transparency and make hospitals more accountable to the communities that they purport to serve,' Idelson said. 'Hospitals that are meeting their charity care obligation should welcome this process and understand that it is an opportunity to rebuild some of the public trust that they have lost through their other policies and practices.'

Hospital Leaders Deploy Talking Points, Including Logical Fallacies 

Perhaps predictably, hospital executives are not so happy:

'This is less about good public policy than it is about politics,' said Michael Hunn, chief executive for southern California hospitals at Providence Health & Services, which has five hospitals in the state. 'I would hate to see a political agenda further harm those that are marginalized in society,' Hunn said. 'No matter what the legislative and political process is, we need to keep in mind the human beings that it is our responsibility to care for.'

Note that Providence Health & Services is the ostensibly non-profit Catholic hospital system accused of putting paying executives multi-million dollar compensation ahead of giving low level employees minimally adequate health insurance as we posted here.  According to the organization's latest 990 form, Mr Hunn got $1,576,978 total compensation in 2011.  So one wonders which human beings he is feeling most responsible for?  Note also that the unsubstantiated allusion to a "political agenda," appears to be an appeal to ridicule, "a fallacy in which ridicule or mockery is substituted for evidence in an 'argument.'"  We have noted before how public relations flacks working for top executives of health care organizations seem to be very good at using such logical fallacies.  The argument Mr Hunn made seems essentially identical to an argument used against a lawsuit to end the tax exemption of a huge Pennsylvania hospital system that has apparently angered the communities which it is supposed to serve while paying its executives millions (look here).

In addition, 

Jan Emerson-Shea, spokesman for the California Hospital Association, said the bill's union backers were hiding their real agenda with 'red herring' issues like highly compensated executives and the superficial dissonance of not-for-profit organizations with healthy margins.

''Not-for-profit hospital' doesn't mean that you don't make a profit--all hospitals need to make a profit to keep the doors open,' Emerson-Shea said

Of course, that last assertion is not true.  Non-profit organizations need to avoid sustaining repeated losses to keep their doors open, but do not need to make any surplus to do so.  And the issue was not whether hospitals make small surpluses, but whether they behave like for-profit corporations, especially in regard to how well they pay hired executives.  So while protesting "red herrings," one spokesperson for hospitals, presumably for hospitals' hired executives, seemed to be arguing that the only alternative to a very large surplus and a very large reserve is a deficit.  By ignoring another obvious alternative, having a small surplus and a small reserve, this argument thus is derived from the logical fallacy known as the false dilemma.  The spokesperson also seemed to be arguing that a deficit inevitably leads to bankruptcy.  Of course prolonged deficits might lead to bankruptcy, but a single deficit would not necessarily do so.  Thus we see the logical fallacy known as the slippery slope. Note further that the argument used by the California executive here was again essentially identical to an argument used against a lawsuit to end the tax exemption of a huge Pennsylvania hospital system that has apparently angered the communities which it is supposed to serve while paying its executives millions.  So it looks like once again the hired executives and their public relations operatives have their talking points in line.   (See this post, from which our argument about the logical fallacies employed first in Pennsylvania came.)

Summary

It really is beginning to look like there is some sort of trend, albeit still small, towards organized resistance against the hired executives and cronies who have made themselves rich from large health care organizations, putting their self-interest and enrichment apparently before taking care of patients and serving the public's health.  As we have said ad infinitum....

Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

The Dangers of Big Corporate Health Care: Deceptive Marketing of Cancer Treatments

A series of articles over the last few months, culminating in an investigative report by Reuters, provided the newest example of what can go wrong when corporations provide direct care to vulnerable patients.  In this case, the vulnerable patients had cancer, and the corporation that provided them care was the Cancer Treatment Centers of America (CTCA).  I will try to go through the case chronologically.

As Rueters reported, CTCA "was founded in 1988 by Richard J. Stephenson, who has been chairman ever since."

The Founder's Checkered Past

A Misdemeanor

As Reuters noted,

A graduate of Northwestern University Law School, Stephenson started out as an investment banker. In 1966 he became a trustee of Americans Building Constitutionally, an organization that helped wealthy individuals set up not-for-profit corporations and personal trusts to avoid paying federal income and inheritance taxes.

In 1969, a California state court found the group's top official and six others guilty of grand theft or conspiring to commit grand theft. Stephenson had pleaded no contest to false advertising, a misdemeanor, and testified for the state, according to media reports at the time.

Allegations of Use of Unproven Cancer Treatments

Stephenson seemingly stayed out of trouble until 1975, but

Stephenson ventured into healthcare in 1975, when he and partners bought Zion-Benton Hospital in Zion, Illinois, renaming it American International Hospital. By the late 1980s, American International was facing financial problems and its 'reputation had been severely damaged' by local press reports about its use of unproven cancer treatments, according to a 2004 court opinion on a successful petition by a former CTCA president seeking an increased valuation for his share of the company.

CTCA: No More Unsubstantiated Claims

Apparently around the time American International Hospital starting having major troubles, Stephenson branched out,

In 1988, Stephenson founded CTCA. He was motivated, said CEO Bonner, by the difficulty he had identifying and obtaining the best therapies for his mother after she developed bladder cancer. She died in 1982.

By 1996, CTCA got into trouble too,

 

Cancer Treatment Centers of America got in trouble with regulators in 1996, when the Federal Trade Commission accused it of, among other things, presenting survival claims it couldn't support. The company entered into a consent decree with the FTC and, without admitting any of the allegations, agreed not to make unsubstantiated outcomes claims.

"Unscientific Therapies"

As far as I can tell, all was then quiet until 2012.  Late that year, a Forbes columnist wrote,

 Alongside standard, science-based cancer therapies, CTCA also offers an array of questionable, unscientific therapies, which it proudly labels as part of its 'integrative cancer treatment.'  CTCA advertises many such treatments, including:

* Acupuncture
* Acupressure
* Chiropractic
* Naturopathy
* Homeopathy
* Mind-Body medicine (including Reiki and Qi Gong)

None of the treatments in this list has any scientific support showing that they provide a benefit to cancer patients.  Some of them carry a real risk of harm, as I’ve written about previously.

He further charged,

CTCA makes multiple unsupported, unscientific claims for its alternative treatments, such as:

• 'Naturopathic medicine can help reduce these [cancer-related] symptoms, strengthen the immune system and support the healing process throughout your brain cancer treatment.'
• 'Acupuncture may help to alleviate [cancer] treatment-related side effects, such as nausea and vomiting.'
• 'When used during your leukemia treatment, our chiropractic care services can help correct bone, muscle and joint problems and restore nerve function.'

These are just a few examples. These claims, and CTCA’s marketing of the therapies involved, present a huge ethical problem.

Manipulated Survival Statistics

Then, in March 2012, the Reuters investigative reporters charged that CTCA manipulated its survival statistics to make its results look better.

CTCA reports on its website that the percentage of its patients who are alive after six months, a year, 18 months and longer regularly tops national figures. For instance, 60 percent of its non-small-cell lung cancer patients are alive at six months, CTCA says, compared to 38 percent nationally. And 64 percent of its prostate cancer patients are alive at three years, versus 38 percent nationally.

Such claims are misleading, according to nine experts in cancer and medical statistics whom Reuters asked to review CTCA's survival numbers and its statistical methodology.

The experts were unanimous that CTCA's patients are different from the patients the company compares them to, in a way that skews their survival data. It has relatively few elderly patients, even though cancer is a disease of the aged. It has almost none who are uninsured or covered by Medicaid - patients who tend to die sooner if they develop cancer and who are comparatively numerous in national statistics.

Carolyn Holmes, a former CTCA oncology information specialist in Tulsa, Oklahoma, said she and others routinely tried to turn away people who 'were the wrong demographic' because they were less likely to have an insurance policy that CTCA preferred. Holmes said she would try to 'let those people down easy.'

Equally significant, CTCA includes in its outcomes data only those patients 'who received treatment at CTCA for the duration of their illness' - patients who have the ability to travel to CTCA locations from the get-go, without seeking local treatment first. That means excluding, for example, those who have exhausted treatment options closer to home and arrive at a CTCA facility with advanced disease.

Accepting only selected patients and calculating survival outcomes from only some of them 'is a huge bias and gives an enormous advantage to CTCA,' said biostatistician Donald Berry of MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston.

Furthermore,

CTCA also appears to exclude the vast majority of its patients when it calculates survival data. In survival results from 2004 to 2008 posted on its website, CTCA reported 61 patients with advanced prostate cancer, 97 with advanced breast cancer, 434 with advanced lung cancer, and 165 with advanced colon or rectal cancer. These are the four most common solid tumors. In the same period, CTCA treated thousands of patients at its Zion facility alone, according to filings with state regulators.

'We agree that some of our sample sizes' are small 'and have always stated this as a limitation of our study,' said Xiong, the consultant to CTCA.

'I'd have some concerns about why and wonder if some cherry-picking was going on,' said Spectrum Health's Campbell.

Moreover, while the standard reporting period for cancer survival is five years after diagnosis, CTCA on its website doesn't go that far; for the four most common tumors, it reports survival up to four years at most. And as Reuters found, the company's advantage often diminishes as the five-year mark approaches

 
The Founder's Checkered Present

By the way, also in the last few months, watchdog groups have asked for an investigation of CTCA's founder for possible deceptive actions that might have violated US election laws.  In December, 2012, the Washington Post reported

In the weeks before the election, more than $12 million in donations was funneled through two Tennessee corporations to the FreedomWorks super PAC after negotiations with [CTCA Founder Richard J] Stephenson over a preelection gift of the same size, according to three current and former employees with knowledge of the arrangement.

Then,

 Two watchdog groups last week asked the Federal Election Commission and the Justice Department to investigate the donations from the two Tennessee companies. The groups, Democracy 21 and the Campaign Legal Center, say the arrangement could violate federal laws that prohibit attempting to hide the true source of a political contribution by giving it under another name.

Summary

In summary, there are now charges in the media that Cancer Treatment Centers of America manipulated its survival data to makes its advertised results appear better, while it also advertises unproven complementary and alternative medicine treatments  as effective.  In the past the company had signed a consent decree not to make (presumably any more) unsubstantiated claims.  Meanwhile, the company's founder, who has a past history of a no contest plea to false advertising, and who had previously run a hospital system also charged with making unsupported survival claims, has been accused of hiding political donations.

Thus this organization, run by someone who has his own history of deception, has been found to make exaggerated and/or unsubstantiated advertising claims of several types and at different times.  These claims could attract vulnerable patients who perhaps could get better care elsewhere, possibly leading to excess morbidity and even early mortality. 

So Cancer Treatment Centers of America seems to be the latest reason to worry about the laissez faire US system which allows lightly regulated for-profit corporations to provide direct "care" to our most vulnerable patients.   We have recently discussed how a for-profit hospital chain may have been over treating some patients and under treating others, possibly risking patients' health to increase revenues (look here);  how for-profit hospice corporations by enrolling patients who do not actually have terminal illness for palliative care only  could be denying potentially curative treatment to curable patients (look here); and how for-profit mental health clinics and drug treatment centers could be providing shoddy, and potentially dangerous care to boost revenues (look here and here).

We will see if the newest part of the pattern of news reports about CTCA and its founder, coupled with reports about other for-profit health care corporations that provide direct care to vulnerable patients provoke any official action.  However, the pattern is substantial enough so that it should make all health care professionals and all patients  reconsider whether ever to trust a for-profit hospital system, hospital, clinic or other site providing direct health care to patients.

On a policy level, as I have said before,....   In my humble opinion, before the health care bubble bursts, we need to challenge the notion that direct health care should ever be provided, or that medicine ought to be practiced by for-profit corporations. Before market fundamentalism became so prominent, many states prohibited the corporate practice of medicine, and the American Medical Association forbade the commercialization of medicine.

 It is time to heed that wisdom. I submit that we will not be able to have good quality, accessible health care at an affordable price until we restore physicians as independent, ethical health care professionals, and until we restore small, independent, community responsible, non-profit hospitals as the locus for inpatient care.

Another Reason for Hope? - Concern about Excessive Executive Pay in Health Care Goes Mainstream

Another recent case suggested that the problem of excess, disproportionate compensation of health care executives is becoming more of a mainstream concern. 

The Case of Eastern Connecticut Health Network

The case appeared in the Manchester (CT) Journal-Inquirer (link requires subscription).  Here are the basics:

ECHN Inc., which owns Mancester Memorial and Rockville General hospitals, reported to the IRS last year that the company paid its president and CEO, Peter J Karl, a total of $1,042,200 in salary and fringe benefits.  That's a 30.7 percent increase over Karl's compensation reported in the previous year,....

ECHN also reported that six other top executives were paid between $254,640 and $591,090, representing increases of as much as 20.6 percent. 

ECHN is yet another relatively small non-profit hospital system with a million dollar plus CEO.

For comment on this, I turn back to the Journal-Inquirer article.  One person the reporter interviewed

says the big salaries and bonuses paid to top officials at Eastern Connecticut Health Network are part of a national scandal over executive compensation propelled by the 'pursuit of talent for short-term gains.'

'The hospital industry is emblematic of what's happened in executive compensation in the United States, where the multiple of the lowest- paid employee to get to the salary of the highest-paid employee has just exploded over the last 30 years,'....

Furthermore, the person interviewed noted that hospital executives were bemoaning decreases in payments to their institutions by state government "while making 10 to 20 times as much money as" the state governor makes.  In this case, the CEO, Mr Karl's "compensation package was 6.9 times [Governor Daniel P] Malloy's salary of $150,000."

A second person interviewed said

Salaries have gotten to the point where they have skyrocketed and are out of control.

He also raised an issue about conflicts of interest affecting the ECHN board

he agreed with state health care advocate, Victoria Veltri, who told the Journal Inquirer last week that nearly $1 million in business deals between ECHN and five members of its board of trustees require further scrutiny

Criticism from the Mainstream

I have been coy about who the commentators were, but bear with me.

So we see in this one somewhat obscure newspaper article about one small regional hospital system points that we have been raising for years about the perverse incentives generated by excess executive compensation in health care.  We have frequently discussed how such compensation is often completely untethered to the organizations' financial results, much less its positive effects on patients' and the public's health.  Compensation often rises faster than inflation, faster than revenue (and sometimes when revenue declines and deficits loom), and even when the organization is facing financial, clinical, or ethical challenges.  Thus it often seems that the primary goal of the organization has become enriching top executives (look here for a recent example).  As the first commentator noted above, this seems to arise out of the business school dogma that puts short-term revenue ahead of all other goals (which we discussed here, and can be termed financialization.)

But our concerns do seem to be getting more mainstream.  The first commentator above was actually the Governor of Connecticut, Dannel P Malloy, himself.  The second commenter was Connecticut state Senator Steve Cassano.  So prominent politicians are beginning to see the perversity of excess executive compensation in health care at a time of still burgeoning health care costs and still threatened health care access and quality. 

So maybe some more people will listen this time when we repeat....  Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.