The Mystery of the Northwestern Settlement

Watson, quick, the game's afoot.  We have discussed a large number of legal settlements by large health care organizations that serve as markers of misbehavior and often lack of leaderships' responsibility for same.  These settlements often follow a common pattern.  Yet this week a settlement appeared that was quite different, and hence raised some important questions.

The Basics of the Settlement

I will summarize the settlement as described by the Wall Street Journal.  The basic points were:

Northwestern University agreed to pay nearly $3 million to settle claims that a former cancer researcher fraudulently used federal grant money for personal expenses, including food, hotels and airfare for family trips between 2003 and 2010.

The settlement in the civil suit was unsealed Tuesday by the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, which investigated claims brought by a whistle blower under the False Claims Act.

The settlement seemed to be more about the researcher, Dr Charles L Bennett, than Northwestern,

At the time of the alleged fraud, Dr. Bennett was the principal investigator on research funded by the National Institutes of Health, studying adverse drug events, multiple myeloma, a blood disorder known as thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura, and quality of care for cancer patients.

According to the settlement agreement, he allegedly billed federal grants for family trips, meals and hotels for himself and friends, and for 'consulting fees' for unqualified friends and family. Northwestern also allegedly improperly subcontracted, at Dr. Bennett's request, with various universities for services that were paid for by the NIH grants.

'Allowing researchers to use federal grant money to pay for personal travel, hotels, and meals and to hire unqualified friends and relatives as 'consultants' violates the public trust and federal law,' U.S. Attorney Gary S. Shapiro said in a statement.

Meanwhile,

 Northwestern, which is in Evanston, Ill., cooperated with the investigators and didn't admit to any wrongdoing, according to a statement by the university.

The settlement was the result of the actions of a purported whistle-blower,

The whistleblower, Melissa Theis, worked as a purchasing coordinator in the Feinberg school's department of hematology and oncology, processing invoices when she 'noticed some red flags,' according to her attorney, Linda Wyetzner, of the Evanston firm Behn & Wyetzner Chartered.

The federal False Claims Act allows private citizens who allege government programs are being defrauded to file actions on behalf of the government and receive a portion, usually 15% to 30%, of any recovered damages. Ms. Theis will get $498,100 in settlement proceeds, according to the agreement.

The settlement resulted from the efforts of multiple federal agencies,

 The allegations were investigated by the NIH, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General and the U.S. attorney's office.

Curious Aspects and the Questions They Raise

So here is yet another settlement by a large health care organization, in this case, the prestigious academic medical center of a well known university.  This one, however, does not follow the usual pattern, and includes some quite curious aspects.

Media Attention vs Severity

The settlement so far has generated articles in the WSJ (above), the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Sun-Times, Crains Chicago Business, Medscape, Modern Healthcare, UPI, Bloomberg, other local Chicago and university publications, and local outlets in South Carolina, the state in which Dr Bennett currently works.
 
The amount of the grants that Dr Bennett allegedly misused was $8 million, according to the University Herald.

There are no allegations that any activities of Dr Bennett or the university affected the quality of clinical research, clinical teaching, or patient care.

Contrast that substantial media attention to that generated by another recent settlement we just discussed, that of Pfizer misbranding of Rapamune (look here.)  This involved the excess promotion of a relatively dangerous drug that likely resulted in harm to many patients.  The over-promotion may have caused up to 90% of the drug's $200 million yearly sales.  The settlement itself was for $491 million.  Yet while it got more coverage, mainly from local media outlets which covered it because the settlement will result in payments to individual states, only four big national outlets have covered it so far, again the Wall Street Journal, and  the New York Times, Reuters and Businessweek.

Why did a relatively small settlement of alleged financial misbehavior without clinical implications get nearly as much attention as a settlement fifty times bigger that involved actions that likely harmed patients?

Intensity of the Government Response

Dr Bennett's alleged misuse of grant funds required investigation by four different federal agencies, including the FBI.  Pfizer's misbranding of a dangerous drug seemingly was handled only by one, and the FBI was not obviously involved.  In fact, the FBI rarely has rarely been mentioned in the media coverage of most of the legal settlements we have discussed.

Why did again a case of relatively small alleged financial misbehavior require such massive federal resources when much bigger cases which had implications for clinical care, policy, or research seemed to command lesser resources?

Naming and Shaming

The settlement did not involve any admission of any wrongdoing by Northwestern.

In contrast, nearly all the news coverage of this settlement emphasized the role of Dr Charles L Bennett.  The coverage seemed to be following the lead of the Department of Justice press release, which included,

 Northwestern allegedly allowed one of its researchers, Dr. Charles L. Bennett, to submit false claims under research grants from the National Institutes of Health. The settlement covers improper claims that Dr. Bennett submitted for reimbursement from the federal grants for professional and consulting services, subcontracts, food, hotels, travel and other expenses that benefited Dr. Bennett, his friends, and family from Jan. 1, 2003, through Aug. 31, 2010.

Yet Dr Bennett appeared not to be a party in this settlement, and it was unclear whether he had a direct opportunity to respond to it.  The Wall Street Journal did note that after it was announced,

 James M. Becker, an attorney for Dr. Bennett, said, 'We deny the allegations.…We are actively engaged in discussions to resolve the allegations.'

We have discussed numerous legal settlements by large health care organizations, often involving hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, sometimes involving guilty pleas by the companies involved or their subsidiaries.  Almost never do these settlements name or involve in any way persons who authorized, directed, or implemented the misbehavior.  In fact, we have commented again and again about the impunity of health care organizational managers and executives.  For example, the recent $491 million Pfizer settlement did not name or punish any individuals.  Furthermore, Pfizer's $2.3 billion settlement for deceptive marketing of a drug later pulled from the market (Bextra) did not name much less penalize any responsible individuals (look here.)  Also, GlaxoSmithKline's $3 billion settlement of numerous unethical practices did not name much less penalize any responsible individuals (look here).

So why was naming and shaming Dr Charles L Bennett such an important part of the relatively small Northwestern settlement, when much larger settlements, many involving unethical behavior that could have harmed patients or distorted medical research, and some of which involved corporate guilty pleas to criminal charges did not involve naming and shaming any responsible person?    
 
How Accountable was Dr Bennett?

As in the Wall Street Journal version, the settlement implies that Dr Bennett was the person most responsible.  The Chicago Sun-Times put it this way,

 Dr. Charles L. Bennett allegedly took his wife on personal trips, then illegally billed the flights, hotels and meals to the National Institutes of Health, claiming it was part of his cancer-fighting work. And he allegedly submitted phony bills for his work over a seven-year period beginning in 2003.

Here I will have to interject a bit of information about how federal grants work.  As I learned when I was a young faculty member, and as I confirmed with several other experienced researchers who have run and reviewed federal grants, these grants are made to institutions.  In the current case, the grant apparently went to Northwestern University.  The institution that receives the grant is responsible for making all payments and disbursements related to that grant.  The grant's Principal Investigator is responsible for the scientific conduct of the grant, but NOT payments, disbursements, business management or accounting.  The Principal Investigator can request that payments be made for various things, including travel expenses and consulting work.  But the Principal Investigator cannot directly authorize or make these payments.  They are authorized, signed, and made by institutional administrators, usually in grants and contracts offices or the equivalent, and usually only after copious paperwork to justify the payments.

So Dr Bennett may have requested reimbursement for travel expenses, or requested the university to hire a consultant.  But university managers must have made those payments, unless the university's grants administration mechanism had completely broken down.  Note that given the usual ways grants are administered, it would appear that Ms Theis, the ostensible whistle-blower, who will receive nearly one half of a million dollars from this settlement, actually may have had more direct responsibility for making the payments in question than did Dr Bennett.

Presumably, that is why the settlement was made by Northwestern.

Why then did the settlement, the DOJ press release, and the media coverage so emphasize Dr Bennett's responsibility, and so minimize the role of the university?  

Was Anyone Else Accountable?

The DOJ press release, and all the media articles on the case,  save one, mention only Dr Bennett as the person at fault.  Crain's Chicago Healthcare Daily, however, suggested someone else was responsible,

Northwestern University's nearly $3 million settlement of fraud claims by the federal government protects the director of the school's cancer center, who allegedly failed to supervise a researcher who used grant money to cover personal expenses over a seven-year period.

Dr. Steven Rosen, director of the Robert H. Lurie Comprehensive Center for Cancer, and Dr. Charles L. Bennett, a researcher who is no longer with the center, were both named in a whistleblower complaint unsealed on Tuesday, when the settlement was announced.

Dr. Bennett used federal grant money for family trips and fraudulent consulting fees for his brother and cousin from 2003-10, the government alleges.

Dr. Rosen 'failed to exercise appropriate responsibility,' Randall Samborn, a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's office said. 'It was a supervisory function that he didn't adequately fulfill.'

When the settlement was announced, Mr. Samborn said the agreement did not cover either doctor. On Wednesday, he corrected himself, saying that settlement covered Dr. Rosen, but not Dr. Bennett.

As I noted above, the way federal grants work, it was the university, and its managers and leaders, who were responsible for making all payments on this and other federal grants.

Why did the government press release and the media coverage emphasize Dr Bennett's alleged role, while ignoring any possible responsibility of anyone else, especially his supervisor?


Backgrounds of the Principles

Dr Bennett and Dr Rosen, who seemingly were treated so differently in this settlement, travel in very different circles.

Most media articles described Dr Bennett as a prolific researcher and medical academic.  Although some described his areas of interest in hematology and oncology, only Medscape described one particular project of his.  

Dr. Bennett's research efforts included a 2008 study on which he was the first author (JAMA. 2008;299:914-924). The study was the first meta-analysis to identify an increased mortality risk in cancer patients associated with erythropoiesis-stimulating agents.(1)

In fact, as we discussed here,  Dr Bennett was the first author of a meta-analysis that was the first to show that epoetins increased the rates of adverse effects and death for cancer patients.  This evidence lead to reduced use of some very expensive drugs made by Johnson and Johnson and Amgen, and hence reduced revenues for both companies.

The JAMA article noted that at the time he wrote it, Dr Bennett had financial relationships with Amgen.  He and a coauthor "reported serving as consultants to AMGEN and Dr Bennett reported he has received grant support from AMGEN previously."

Note that Amgen pleaded guilty to misbranding its epoetin, Aranesp, and therefore paid fine and a civil settlement totaling $762 million.  Given the data on this drug class' adverse events, as shown by Dr Bennett and others, it is likely that the misbranding lead to patients being harmed by the drug without receiving any benefits (look here.) 

After writing that article, Dr Bennett became known as a strong skeptic of the pharmaceutical industry.  Just before the JAMA article was published, he coauthored an editorial which wondered if conflicts of interest would ever prove to be acceptable once sufficient research was done.(2)  In that article, he disclosed consulting for, and receiving honoraria and research grants from Amgen.  In 2010, he published research showing the effects of conflicts of interest on reporting of possible adverse effects based on basic science research about epoetins.(3)  By then he apparently no longer had financial relationships with Amgen.  In 2011, he reported a survey of major cases of pharmaceutical fraud resulting in legal actions.(4)

Dr Bennett became known for skepticism about the practices of pharmaceutical companies, and for publishing about the harms of specific drugs, despite his previous financial relationships with Amgen. 

However, Dr Rosen apparently has continued to work closely with industry.  His faculty disclosure page revealed  the following industry relationships

Consulting / Related Activities
Faculty member engaged in activities such as speaking, advising, consulting, or providing educational programs for the following companies or other for-profit entities:

• Allos Therapeutics, Inc.
• Carden Jennings Publishing Co., Ltd.
• Cerner Corporation
• Dava Oncology, LP
• Elorac, Inc.
• Envision Communications
• Health Practices Consulting - unverified entity
• Plexus Communications
• Prostrakan, Inc.
• Seattle Genetics, Inc.
• Studio ER Congressi (Triumph Group, Inc.)
• The Medal Group Corp.

In addition, faculty member received compensation for medical record consultation and/or expert witness testimony.

Ownership or Investment Interests
Faculty member had an ownership or investment interest in the following companies:

• AuraSense, LLC
• Nanosphere, Inc.

Royalty Payments and Inventor Share
Faculty member has the right to receive payments or may receive future financial benefits for inventions or discoveries related to the following companies or other entities:

• Nanosphere, Inc. 

We have seen various important effects of individual and institutional conflicts of interest in health care.  We have seen corporatism and regulatory capture affecting government and its dealings in health care.  

Did Dr Bennett's break with a powerful industry make it easier to set him up as the villain in this story?

Summary   

The settlement by Northwestern University, which was mainly about allegations made against Dr Charles L Bennett, who was not a party to the settlement, was very different that the vast majority of the march of legal settlements whose continuation we have frequently discussed.

The settlement and its media coverage raised important questions whose answers would be important to the assessment of  our current regulatory and legal response to misbehavior by and within large health care organizations.  Health Care Renewal is about raising such issues by commenting on public information, media reports, and research.  I hope those with capacity to investigate will consider these questions.  Inquiring minds want to know.

Roy M. Poses MD in Health Care Renewal 

References

1.  Bennett CI, Silver SM, Djulbegovic B et al.  Venous thromboembolism and mortality associated with recombinant erythropoietin and darbepoetin adminstration for the treatment of cancer-associated anemia.  JAMA 2008; 299: 914-924.
2.  Djulbegovic B, Angolotta C, Knox KE, Bennett CI. The sound and the fury: financial conflicts of interest in oncology.  J Clin Oncol 2007; 25:3567-3568.  Link here 
3.  Bennett CI, Lai SY, Henke M et al.  Association between pharmaceutical support and basic science research on erythropoiesis-stimulating agents.  Arch Intern Med 2010; 170: 1490-1498.  Link here.
4.  Qureshi Z, Sartor O, Xirasagar S, Liu Y, Bennett CI.  Pharmaceutical fraud and abuse in the United States, 1996-2010.  Arch Intern Med 2011; 171: 1503-1506.  Link here.

Pfizer's Umpteenth Settlement (for $491 Million Plus a Guilty Plea), but No Person Held Responsible

The world's largest research based pharmaceutical company was in court again, as reported by the New York Times,

 The drug maker Pfizer agreed to pay $491 million to settle criminal and civil charges over the illegal marketing of the kidney-transplant drug Rapamune, the Justice Department announced on Tuesday. 

In particular,

 The recent case centers on the practices of Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, which Pfizer acquired in 2009.

Rapamune, which prevents the body’s immune system from rejecting a transplanted organ, was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1999 for use in patients receiving a kidney transplant. However, federal officials said Wyeth aggressively promoted the drug for use in patients receiving other organ transplants, even offering financial incentives to its sales force to do so.

Accusations of Wyeth’s practices became public in 2010 after a whistle-blower lawsuit filed by two former employees was unsealed.

After lawmakers announced a Congressional inquiry, the Justice Department opted to join the lawsuit. The settlement announced Tuesday, which also resolves a second, similar whistle-blower suit, includes a criminal fine and forfeiture of $233.5 million, and a civil settlement of $257.4 million with the federal government, all 50 states and the District of Columbia. 

The case did not get much media coverage.  So far, the only other somewhat detailed article on it was put out by Bloomberg.   In fact, the lawyer for two of the whistle-blowers who alerted federal authorities to what Wyeth was doing had to say

the spate of pharmaceutical settlements in recent years had blunted reaction to what he said were shameful practices. 'Everybody’s been asking me why this case is different than any other,' he said. 'We used to trust these companies. You can’t trust these companies anymore.'

However, we should not be too blase.  This case was not only about money.  The over-promotion of a potentially dangerous drug likely lead to patients being harmed in the absence of any benefits.  Rapamune suppresses the immune system and increases risks of serious infections and malignancy.  Specific serious adverse events have been reported when it is used in transplants of organs other than the kidney (e.g., lung and liver transplants).  (See full prescribing information here.)  Bloomberg reported that 90% of Wyeth's revenues from Rapamune came from off-label uses, suggesting that quite a few people may have been adversely affected by its excess use. 

As in most other members of the march of legal settlements by big health care organizations, this case involved no negative consequences for anybody who authorized, directed, or implemented the improper marketing practices.  While such people must have existed, they were not even named in the press coverage.  At least this settlement involved a guilty plea to a crime, albeit a misdemeanor (misbranding as reported by Bloomberg), so the company did have to admit some wrongdoing.  

A Pfizer manager, however, tried to disavow responsibility, as noted by Bloomberg,

'Pfizer was not a subject or target of this matter, and cooperated fully with the government from the time it learned of this investigation in October 2009,' Chris Loder, a Pfizer spokesman,...

But Pfizer had purchased Wyeth, and in doing so got not only assets and profits, but responsibility for actions.

Also, neither the settlement nor the criminal plea seemed to take into account Pfizer's amazingly sorry recent track record.  I am losing count of all of Pfizer's settlements and/or guilty plea or convictions since 2000.  (The updated list of previous legal results is in the Appendix.)  

People found guilty of small-time Medicaid or Medicare fraud often forfeit all their assets and go to jail.  Yet actions by large pharmaceutical companies that may harm patients and cost many millions of dollars almost never result in any individual facing any negative consequences, or even being named and shamed.  Meanwhile, the managers of these companies may make gargantuan amounts of money partially rationalized by the revenues produced by such recurrent misbehavior.  In 2012, according to the company's 2013 proxy filing, Pfizer CEO Ian Reed's total compensation was  $25,634,136, and the four next most highly paid executives all made more than $5,000,000. 

So the Kabuki play that is regulation of and law enforcement for large health care organizations goes on.  As our society is being increasingly divided into a huge majority in increasingly difficult economic circumstances and a small and  increasingly rich minority, it also seems to be increasingly divided into little people who may be ruined by lawsuits, and imprisoned for even minor infractions, and big people who have impunity.  

True health care reform would need to start by making leaders of big health care organizations accountable for their organizations' misbehavior. 

APPENDIX - Pfizer's Settlements

In the beginning of the 21st century, according to the Philadelphia Inquirer, Pfizer made three major settlements,

October 2002: Pfizer and subsidiaries Warner-Lambert and Parke-Davis agreed to pay $49 million to settle allegations that the company fraudulently avoided paying fully rebates owed to the state and federal governments under the national Medicaid Rebate program for the cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor.

May 2004: Pfizer agreed to pay $430 million to settle DOJ claims involving the off-label promotion of the epilepsy drug Neurontin by subsidiary Warner-Lambert. The promotions included flying doctors to lavish resorts and paying them hefty speakers' fees to tout the drug. The company said the activity took place years before it bought Warner-Lambert in 2000.

April 2007: Pfizer agreed to pay $34.7 million in fines to settle Department of Justice allegations that it improperly promoted the human growth hormone product Genotropin. The drugmaker's Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. subsidiary pleaded guilty to offering a kickback to a pharmacy-benefits manager to sell more of the drug.

Thereafter, Pfizer paid a $2.3 billion settlement in 2009 of civil and criminal allegations and a Pfizer subsidiary entered a guilty plea to charges it violated federal law regarding its marketing of Bextra (see post here). 

 Pfizer was involved in two other major cases from then to early 2010, including one in which a jury found the company guilty of violating the RICO (racketeer-influenced corrupt organization) statute (see post here).  

The company was listed as one of the pharmaceutical "big four" companies in terms of defrauding the government (see post here).  

Pfizer's Pharmacia subsidiary settled allegations that it inflated drugs costs paid by New York in early 2011 (see post here).   

In March, 2011, a settlement was announced in a long-running class action case which involved allegations that another Pfizer subsidiary had exposed many people to asbestos (see this story in Bloomberg).  

In October, 2011, Pfizer settled allegations that it illegally marketed bladder control drug Detrol (see this post). 

In August, 2012, Pfizer settled allegations that its subsidiaries bribed foreign (that is, with respect to the US) government officials, including government-employed doctors (see this post).

In December, 2012, Pfizer settled federal charges that its Wyeth subsidiary deceptively marketed the proton pump inhibitor drug Protonix, using systematic efforts to deceive approved by top management, and settled charges by multiple states' Attorneys' General that it deceptively marketed Zyvox and Lyrica (see this post).  

 In January, 2013, Pfizer settled Texas charges that it had misreported information to and over-billed Medicaid (see this post). 

Why Do People Think US Health Care is Corrupt? - The Examples of Amgen, Mallinckrodt Settling Charges of Giving Kickbacks to Doctors to Induce them to Prescribe Their Products, While No Individual Suffers Negative Consequences

We recently posted a discussion of the results of Transparency International's 2013 corruption barometer, focusing on the US results.  43% of survey respondents thought US health care is corrupt.  Our coverage, apparently the only substantial discussion of the US results published in the US, got star ranking for a while on Reddit.  But many anonymous commentators dismissed the survey results as coming from a naive public who does not understand health care economics.

I submit that one can recognize corruption without a degree in economics.  In fact, as we discussed in the initial post, there is a lot of evidence for the prevalence of health care corruption in the US, other developed countries, and globally.  It is just that such evidence rarely gets discussed in public (the anechoic effect, as we say on this blog), probably because doing so might make those who are profiting from the corruption uncomfortable.

So today let me summarize just the latest evidence about US health care corruption, as defined by Transparency International as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.  (Note that the Transparency International definition of corruption, which is an ethical, not necessarily a legal definition, at least in most jurisdictions.)

Amgen

An article in the Thousand Oaks [CA] Acorn described the legal settlement,

Amgen Inc. paid the United States more than $15 million this month as part of a settlement agreement to resolve allegations that the biopharmaceutical company used financial kickbacks to persuade doctors to prescribe the cancer drug Xgeva to their patients.

The settlement resolves a qui tam, or 'whistleblower,' lawsuit filed Jan. 20, 2012, in federal court by William Davis and Spencer Miller—two Amgen employees who work at the company’s Thousand Oaks headquarters.

Davis, sales planning director for Amgen’s oncology business unit, and Miller, a senior marketing manager at the company, alleged their employer violated both the Medicare Anti- Kickback Statute and False Claims Act—two laws that aim to prevent Medicare fraud and abuse.

The allegations were that Amgen used a somewhat complex and deceptive strategy to pay doctors who prescribed its drug, using a survey about practice patterns as a cover story,

According to the U.S. attorney’s office, Amgen used what the company called 'Deep Dive' contracts—or data purchase agreements—in an effort to boost sales of Xgeva, which was approved by the FDA in late 2010 for use by certain cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy.

The drug is most commonly prescribed to prevent bone fractures in patients who have been diagnosed with a certain type of tumor after it has spread to the bones.

Under Amgen’s original Deep Dive program, the company paid doctors to fill out an Internet-based survey, which asked how they were treating patients with bone cancer and which drugs they used.

'That’s not illegal to do,' said Abraham Meltzer, assistant U.S. attorney in the Los Angeles civil fraud section. 'A lot of pharmaceutical companies purchase data legitimately on how various conditions are treated.'

But Amgen altered its Deep Dive program, Meltzer said, by increasing the amount of money it offered to pay the doctors who specifically prescribed Xgeva to their patients.

Also,

 The U.S. attorney’s office also alleged that Amgen paid oncologists and urologists to participate in market research surveys, audience response sessions and advisory programs that publicized the benefits of Xgeva.

As is typical in such cases, the settlement did not require any contrition on Amgen's part.  Instead,

In a prepared statement emailed to the Thousand Oaks Acorn on Tuesday, Amgen denied all allegations of wrongful conduct.

'Amgen settled this matter to avoid the delay, uncertainty, inconvenience and expense of protracted litigation,' the statement read.

As is also typical, there seemed to be no negative consequences for the human beings who must have engineered the "Deep Dive" contracts and the payments to the oncologists and urologists.  Nor was there any overt consideration of Amgen's sketchy recent ethical record, as described by the Acorn,

This month’s settlement is not the first time the biopharmaceutical giant has been held to answer for kickback allegations or false claims charges.

In December 2012, Amgen pleaded guilty to illegally selling the drug Aranesp, an anti-anemia drug, for uses or doses not approved by the FDA, according to the U.S. Department of Justice.

As part of the false claims case, which was also brought on by a whistleblower lawsuit, Amgen agreed to pay a $612-million civil settlement to the U.S. and individual states, as well as $150 million in criminal penalties.

Then in April, the Thousand Oaks-based company paid the U.S. another $24.9 million to settle whistleblower allegations that it gave financial kickbacks to long-term care pharmacy providers in exchange for switching Medicare and Medicaid benefi- ciaries from a competing drug to Aranesp, a DOJ press release states.

We discussed the guilty plea in the cases of Aranesp misbranding and alleged kickbacks to pharmacists.  Also, in 2013, we noted that Amgen settled allegations that it overpriced its products sold to government health programs in 36 states.  We also noted that despite, or perhaps because of all this misbehavior, the current CEO of Amgen received over $13 million in compensation in 2012, while his predecessor walked away with over $9 million that year.

Mallinckrodt

A small news item from the Associated Press, via the Nanaimo (MO) Daily News, outlined this legal settlement,

A St. Louis-based drug maker will pay $3.5 million to settle allegations that it paid doctors to prescribe 'outdated, third rate' antidepressants and sleep aids, the U.S. attorney's office in San Francisco announced.

In particular,

The lawsuit alleged the company targeted doctors who prescribed the type of antidepressants and sleep pills Mallinkrodt manufactured.

Again, the company was allowed to settle without admitting anything.

'While we deny the allegations in this matter, we are glad they are resolved,' company spokeswoman Erica Abbett said in a statement.

Again, although human beings would have had to engineer any payments to the doctors to induce them to prescribe, no human beings suffered any consequences as a result of this settlement.

Mallinckrodt, a storied corporate name, had been acquired by Covidien, and then was spun off again as a separate company in June, 2013 (look here).  It had been acquired in 2000 by Tyco International, which later spun off its health care operations as Covidien.   According to its 2013 proxy statement, Covidien's CEO received over $10 million in total compensation in 2012.


[Note that Tyco was the subject of one of the major scandal stories of the early 21st century.  In 2005, at a time when law enforcement authorities were still pursuing actions against elite corporate executives,  its former CEO and CFO were convicted of stealing millions from it (see USAToday summary)].

Summary - Why do People Think US Health Care is Corrupt?  

Again, the Transparency International definition of corruption is abuse of entrusted power for private gain.  I would argue that pharmaceutical companies are entrusted with the power to honestly sell drugs whose benefits to patients outweigh their harms.  I would further argue that paying physicians, who are entrusted with providing the best possible care to each individual patient, to prescribe drugs which may not be the best treatment for individual patients is an abuse of both the company's and the physicians' entrusted power.  Further, such payments provide private gain to the physicians.  They also may increase revenues for the company who makes these payments, and very likely these increased revenues lead to better compensation for those in the company who authorized, directed or directly provided the payments, that is to private gain for these corporate insiders.  Thus it seems that kickbacks to physicians to prescribe drugs is a form of corruption.

While both cases above were settled without admissions of guilt, such settlements do not refute the contentions that kickbacks were given.  Why would the law enforcement officials have brought the cases in the absence of evidence, and why would the companies have settled if the cases were completely baseless?  So I would argue that these settlements provide evidence, although not legal proof, that kickbacks were given.  People with far more legal knowledge than I possess have remarked on the absurdity of settling cases of alleged wrongdoing without any acknowledgement or statement of the facts (see posts here and here).

We have posted lots of instances of conflicts of interest affecting health care, many of which likely involved payments providing private gain that raised the risk of abuse of entrusted power.  We have also discussed many instances of crime, kickbacks, bribery, fraud other kinds of health care corruption.

So were the people who answered the Transparency International survey naive and foolish about health care corruption?  Or did they have reasonable beliefs about a topic that the powers that be really do not want to discuss?

Johnson and Johnson Settles Suit Alleging Management Incompetence and Deception, Managers Continue to Prosper

Very quietly, pharmaceutical/ biotechnology/ medical device corporate giant Johnson & Johnson just settled another lawsuit. The most pithy version is by Ed Silverman on Pharmalot, although Reuters and Bloomberg published short accounts.

The New Settlement

Per Mr Silverman, the gist is:

The health care giant agreed to resolve the dispute brought over allegations that J&J management shirked their responsibilities and allowed a chain of events that resulted in congressional probes; lost market share, consumer confidence and revenue, and a consent decree with the FDA. In the lawsuit, a shareholder charged that J&J bungled the integration of the Pfizer consumer health acquisition, placed inexperienced execs in charges of its OTC unit and cut costs so drastically that quality control suffered.

The lawsuit, which was brought by Ronald Monk, alleged that the health care giant made misleading statements about its products before disclosing problems with the Fort Washington plant and another in Puerto Rico. He also maintained that J&J withheld material information before its decision three years ago to shut down the Fort Washington plant, where contamination led to the unpublicized recall of defective Motrin tablets in 2009.

In agreeing to the settlement, J&J refused to admit any wrongdoing

So let me review. The allegations in this case were all about problems with the management of Johnson and Johnson.  They included allegations that management was incompetent and deceptive.  The incompetence was in handling the core functions of the company, assuring that its drug products were pure and unadulterated.  The deception was of patients, the public, and the nominal owners of the company to whom management is supposed to report, and allegedly included an attempt to cover up concerns about the purity of its drug products.

The proposed settlement follows the current practice of allowing the defendant not to admit the allegations, leaving their truth unproven.  However, one wonders, given that the allegations are about the core responsibilities of management and were leveled by the company owners, why the management would not defend their honor more forthrightly.

The Company's Sorry Legal Record

Furthermore, this settlement also follows the current practice of being made without reference to any other seemingly relevant legal proceedings.  In fact, it is just the latest of a long string of settlements and other resolutions of legal actions, including guilty pleas, by Johnson and Johnson management.  As we summarized most recently here, these included:

- Convictions in two different states in 2010 for misleading marketing of Risperdal
- A guilty plea for misbranding Topamax in 2010
- Guilty pleas to bribery in Europe in 2011 by Johnson and Johnson's DePuy subsidiary
- A guilty plea for marketing Risperdal for unapproved uses in 2011 (see this link for all of the above)

- A guilty plea to misbranding Natrecor by J+J subsidiary Scios (see post here)
- In 2012, testimony in a trial of allegations of unethical marketing of the drug Risperdal (risperidone) by the Janssen subsidiary revealed a systemic, deceptive stealth marketing campaign that fostered suppression of research whose results were unfavorable to the company, ghostwriting, the use of key opinion leaders as marketers in the guise of academics and professionals, and intimidation of whistleblowers. After these revelations, the company abruptly settled the case (see post here).
-  Also in 2012,  Johnson & Johnson was fined $1.1 billion by a judge in Arkansas for deceiving patients and physicians again about Risperdal (look here).
-  Also in 2012, Johnson & Johnson announced it would pay $181 million to resolve claims of deceptive advertising again about Risperdal (see this post).

Even though the record includes a number of settlement in which management did not have to admit guilt, the company has made a surprising number of guilty pleas in just the last few years.  Despite all this evidence of poor, that is incompetent or unethical management, Johnson and Johnson managers have been getting very rich.

As we mentioned here, Mr William Weldon, the outgoing CEO on whose watch most of the misbehavior resulting in the legal actions above occurred, retired with a huge retirement package, after receiving extremely generous compensation prior to that.  The new CEO as of April, 2012,  Mr  Alex Gorsky, per the company's 2013 proxy statement, already owns more than 190,000 Johnson and Johnson shares,  and received $10,977,109  total compensation in 2012.  Mr Weldon received over $29 million in total compensation just for 2012, the year in which he retired.  Other top executives received from over $3.5 million to over $8 million. 

Summary

So why do the stockholders, the owners of Johnson and Johnson continue to pay so much to an executive team on whose watch so many bad things have happened?  Why did law enforcement authorities allow the company to continue to plead guilty or settle cases without imposing any negative consequences on these executives?  Maybe only the Shadow knows. Of course, the lack of any discussion beyond that on Health Care Renewal, that puts each new settlement or guilty plea in the context of the ones before, and juxtaposes them to the rewards of given to management, may not help. 

As we said the last time we addressed the contrast between Johnson and Johnson's sorry legal record and its voluminous payments to executives, we have noted again and again and again that many of largest and once proud health care organizations now have recent records of repeated, egregious ethical lapses. Not only have their leaders have nearly all avoided penalties, but they have become extremely rich while their companies have so misbehaved.

These leaders seem to have become like nobility, able to extract money from lesser folk, while remaining entirely unaccountable for bad results of their reigns. We can see from this case that health care organizations' leadership's nobility overlaps with the supposed "royalty" of the leaders of big financial firms, none of whom have gone to jail after the global financial collapse, great recession, and ongoing international financial disaster (look here). The current fashion of punishing behavior within health care organization with fines and agreements to behave better in the future appears to be more law enforcement theatre than serious deterrent.  As Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick exhorted his fellow Democrats, I exhort state, federal (and international, for that  matter) law enforcement to "grow a backbone" and go after the people who were responsible for and most profited from the ongoing ethical debacle in health care.

As we have said before, true health care reform would make leaders of health care organization accountable for their organizations' bad behavior.

55 of Medtronic's Best Hospital Friends, Including HCA, Settle for $34 Million

The case of the over-marketing of Kyphon's kyphoplasty device (look here) just got more complicated, and now appears to have involved an amazing number of players.

The State of Play

 As reported by the AP (via the Washington Post),

 Fifty-five hospitals in 21 states have agreed to pay $34 million to the U.S. government to settle allegations that they used more expensive inpatient procedures rather than outpatient spinal surgeries to get bigger payments from Medicare, the U.S. Justice Department said Tuesday.

The settlement involves kyphoplasty procedures used to treat spinal fractures usually caused by osteoporosis. It can be done as an outpatient procedure, but he Justice Department said the hospitals performed the surgeries as inpatient procedures to increase Medicare billings.

The current media reports provided little detail about the allegations, but did note that this case has been litigated for a while,

 A similar settlement was reached last year, when 14 hospitals agreed to pay a settlement of more than $12 million. And in 2008, the Justice Department agreed to a $75 million settlement with Medtronic Inc.’s spine business. The government was investigating allegations that Kyphon, a company that had been acquired by Medtronic Spine in 2007, advised hospitals to do inpatient kyphoplasties to bulk up their Medicare payments.

The Players

Per the AP, there were quite a few

In the latest settlement, the largest payments are being made by Atrium Medical Center of Middletown, Ohio, which will pay $4.2 million; Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami, $1.8 million; Altru Health System of Grand Forks, N.D., $1.5 million; Cedars Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, $1.5 million; Wayne Memorial Hospital in Goldsboro, N.C., $1.3 million; Trover Health System of Madisonville, Ky., $1.2 million; The Queen’s Medical Center in Honolulu, $1.1 million; and Des Peres Hospital in suburban St. Louis, $900,000.

Several multi-hospital organizations agreed to settlements, including:
—Twenty-three hospitals with HCA Inc. of Nashville, Tenn., paying a total of $7.1 million.
—Six hospitals with Lifepoint Hospitals Inc. of Brentwood, Tenn., $2.5 million.
—Five hospitals with Trinity Health of Livonia, Mich., $3.9 million.
—Four hospitals with Morton Plant Mease BayCare Health System of Clearwater, Fla., $2.4 million.
—Three hospitals with Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle of North Columbus, Miss., $1.8 million.
—Two hospitals with Bayhealth Medical Center of Newark, Del., $1.1 million.

A Modern Healthcare report noted that the leadership of HCA, the hospital system with the largest liability, made it out to all be a misunderstanding,

Hospital executives say the allegations are prompted by  unclear Medicare rules on when spinal-surgery patients should be held overnight. And they note that even though the whistle-blowers and the government are targeting hospitals, the decision to admit patients is usually dictated by the treating physician.

'We are pleased to see new clarification of industry care standards, which help physicians make decisions regarding kyphoplasty patients,' HCA spokesman Ed Fishbough said in an e-mailed statement Tuesday. 'We are confident as a result that this issue has been resolved.'

However, the case appears to be more complicated than that.

What Really Happened, and Who Benefited?

In fact, we discussed the Medtronic settlement in 2008.  At that time, a New York Times article described the government's allegations about what went on this way,

A unit of Medtronic defrauded Medicare of hundreds of millions of dollars, according to a civil lawsuit that was unsealed Thursday and simultaneously settled with the Justice Department.

Two insiders had said Kyphon, which Medtronic acquired in 2007, improperly persuaded hospitals to keep people overnight for a simple outpatient procedure to repair small fissures of the spine. Medicare then reimbursed the hospitals much more generously than it otherwise would have for the procedure, which was developed as a noninvasive approach that could usually be done in about an hour.

By marketing its products this way, Kyphon was able to artificially drive up demand among hospitals, bolstering its revenue and driving up its stock price. Medtronic subsequently bought the company, its competitor, for $3.9 billion, greatly enriching Kyphon’s senior executives.

Furthermore,

 The scheme at Kyphon was based on Medicare’s practice of reimbursing hospitals more for complex inpatient back surgery than for outpatient care. The two whistle-blowers, Charles M. Bates and Craig Patrick, said Kyphon had deliberately urged doctors to admit patients overnight, knowing the admissions were unnecessary.

Hospitals saw the overnight admissions as a way to raise revenue, the two said, and bought Kyphon’s products, even though they were expensive, starting at $3,500 to repair one spinal fissure. The hospitals could recover the cost through the improper reimbursements for overnight stays.

Kyphon sold so much equipment this way that at one point it enjoyed a 90 percent profit margin, according to the two insiders, both of whom worked in sales positions.

The former employees said the scheme began in 1999, when Kyphon’s products first came to the market. Kyphon’s rapid sales growth and profitability eventually gave rise to a patent dispute with Medtronic, which was dropped when Medtronic acquired it. The acquisition richly rewarded Kyphon’s shareholders, particularly its top executives. The company said its top 15 executives stood to receive about $145 million by cashing in their options and restricted stock.

Note that at that time, Medtronic leadership, whose decision to purchase of Kyphon would end up so enriching Kyphon executives, seemingly had no worries,

A  spokeswoman for Medtronic, Marybeth Thorsgaard, said the company had known Kyphon was under investigation when it made the acquisition. She said it knew that Kyphon’s marketing strategy was being challenged, and took the risk of litigation into account. 'There were no surprises,' she said.

I can find no public record that any individual who authorized, directed, or implemented the arrangements above that lead to huge overcharges to Medicare, and huge revenues to Kyphon and the hospitals was subject to any negative consequences.  As noted above, it appears that the executives who lead Kyphon at the time it was acquired by Medtronic made substantial amounts of money apparently attributable to this scheme to allegedly "defraud Medicare of hundreds of millions of dollars" (as it was described above in the New York Times). 

Using the public record available on the internet, I tried to see how the top three Kyphon executives are doing now.  It appears they are not doing badly, and remain influential in health care.  According to its 2007 proxy statement, just before Kyphon was bought out, its CEO was Richard W Mott.  As best as I can tell, per Equilar, he currently runs a consulting firm (Walkabout Consulting LLC), and was previously chairman of PhotoThera, which just went out of business.  Kyphon's chief science officer was  Karen D Talmadge, PhD, who is now on the board of directors of the American Diabetes Association, and is also "Chair of the Board of Directors of Gynesonics, and serves on the Boards of Directors of Amplyx Pharmaceuticals, Velocity Pharmaceutical Development and Venous Health Systems."  Kyphon's chief operating officer was Arthur T Taylor, who is now on the board of directors of Providence Medical Technology.

The CEO of Medtronic at the time it bought out Kyphon, and the CEO of HCA at the time the arrangements began appear not to be doing badly either.  The CEO of Medtronic at the time it acquired Kyphon was Arthur D Collins Jr, who is now on the boards of directors of Boeing, Alcoa, and US Bancorp, also, according to his Boeing biography, he is a senior adviser to Oak Hill Capital Partners, and is on the Board of Overseers of the Wharton School.  The CEO of HCA at the time of its arrangement with Kyphon began was Dr Thomas Frist Jr, who is currently on the Forbes list of billionaires at number 262 in the world, with a total worth estimated at $4.3 billion.

Summary

In retrospect, this case allegedly involved arrangements between Kyphon, a device company, and multiple hospitals to increase the revenue of all parties by billing the US government for unnecessary hospitalizations occurring after the use of a device made by Kyphon.  The arrangements appeared to have been particularly lucrative for Kyphon's executives after a larger device company, Medtronic, chose to buy Kyphon. Medtronic ultimately paid a large fine and entered into a corporate integrity agreement nine years after the arrangements began.  Now fourteen years after the arrangements began, at least some of the hospitals involved have also paid fines.  The former Kyphon executives who benefited the most seemingly paid no penalties, nor seemingly did any managers of Medtronic or the hospitals who might have gotten larger compensation because of all the revenue that these arrangements generated.    

So initially, the big losers from this complex dance were the US government, and ultimately US tax payers.  Some patients may have also paid out of pocket for unnecessary services and thus lost money too.  Whether some patients suffered due to adverse effects of unneeded procedures was not clear.  Much later, Medtronic and some of the hospitals involved did pay big fines and thus lost some money.  However, it does not appear that they paid anything like what they made from the original scheme, and their payments were delayed for years.  However, the insiders who personally made a lot of money never apparently paid anything later.  So, this case appears to be a vivid example of how such insiders can walk away with piles of money from the misbehavior of their own corporations, while others pay the price.


Many of those of us of a certain age were brought up on myths that ultimately the good guys win and the bad guys lose.  We would all like to believe that the "arc of the moral universe ... bends toward justice."  History and this recent example suggest that it may not do so without our active intervention. 

In health care, as we have said many times (look here for examples), when bad behavior occurs within a large health care organization, rarely are the insiders who authorized or directed it, and who had the most to gain from the behavior ever made to suffer any negative consequences.  As long as health care leaders have such impunity, expect them to continue to personally profit from unethical behavior.  As a result, expect health care costs to continue to rise as quality and access get worse and worse.

True health care reform.needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Pfizer May No Longer be Able to Delay Paying Its Asbestos Claims of Nearly $1 Billion

Pfizer, which claims to be the "world's largest research-based pharmaceutical company," is one step closer to paying a nearly one billion dollar settlement of legal claims of harms due to the asbestos products it used to manufacture.

Pfizer Settles - More or Less - Some of its Asbestos Liability

Most people would not think of Pfizer as a producer of asbestos.  However, the back-story, as reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer, and as we discussed here in 2011, is that

Pfizer used to have a minerals, pigments and metals division and, in 1968, it bought Quigley Company Inc., which made insulation for heavy industry.

Quigley's Insulag contained asbestos.

So,

Quigley stopped production at its facility in Old Bridge, N.J., in 1992.  When it filed for bankruptcy in 2004, Quigley faced more than 160,000 lawsuits, most related to asbestos product liability.

By apparently holding out the legal fiction that Quigley was an independent entity, Pfizer seemed to use to use the bankruptcy filing to delay making any payment of these claims, most of which likely involved illnesses due to asbestos exposure.  As the Inquirer article said,

Pfizer has spent the nine years since arguing that bankruptcy law protects it from such lawsuits.

notwithstanding the fact that Pfizer itself is hardly bankrupt.

But now, as Bloomberg reported (via the New London [CT] Day),

 Pfizer Inc.'s non-operating Quigley Co. won permission to end almost nine years in bankruptcy under a plan that resolves most asbestos claims against the former insulation maker and its parent, the world's largest drugmaker.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein in Manhattan Wednesday approved a Chapter 11 plan under which Pfizer will contribute assets worth $964 million. He rejected a prior plan almost three years ago, saying Pfizer was improperly using Quigley's bankruptcy to shield itself from asbestos claims.

Note that Pfizer has consistently argued that it should bear no responsibility for the effects of the asbestos made by its subsidiary:

'Pfizer has never been found derivatively or directly liable for injuries allegedly caused by Quigley's asbestos- containing products,' [Pfizer spokesman Christopher] Loder said.

Pfizer used to have a minerals, pigments and metals division and, in 1968, it bought Quigley Company Inc., which made insulation for heavy industry. Quigley's Insulag contained asbestos.
Read more at http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20130627_Drug-maker_Pfizer_fails_to_escape_costly_asbestos_case.html#AltGBB8oXa8YPkAC.99

Furthermore,

Pfizer has said throughout the case that it never made or sold Quigley's products and it doesn't have liability for them. Asbestos, once widely used as an insulator, was later shown to cause cancer.

Convenient Fictions

This case received little notice in 2011 and is receiving little notice now, and mainly for its business implications.  Yet the reporting does suggest  dots to connect to reveal some larger hypocrisies.

Dedicated to improving health and well being?

Pfizer asserts on its website that it

has remained dedicated to discovering and developing new, and better, ways to prevent and treat disease and improve health and well being for people around the world.[italics added]

Yet despite this supposed dedication to health and well-being, it has long delayed any possible compensation to people who may have acquired severe, if not fatal disease from contact with one of its products.

As per Bloomberg, note the examples of

people like Brenda Hagerich, 62, of Hot Springs, Ark., may get payments on their claims. Hagerich, whose father died in 1999 of mesothelioma, said she has been waiting for a second distribution of a $125,000 payment.

Ownership without responsibility

According to current media reports,  Pfizer attorneys repeatedly contended that because Quigley was a subsidiary of Pfizer, Pfizer could not be held accountable for its actions.  Yet Pfizer owned, and presumably thus gained all revenue from and chose the leadership of Quigley.  At best, maintaining this fiction seems heartless given Pfizer's stated interest in peoples' "health and well being."

Who knew asbestos was dangerous?

The current reports seem to imply that Pfizer's accountability should be mitigated because at the time it acquired Quigley, no one knew that asbestos was hazardous.  The Bloomberg report stated,

Quigley made asbestos-containing products from the 1940s to the 1970s, including Insulag, a powdered insulation. Pfizer, based in New York, bought the company in 1968.

But,

Pfizer has said throughout the case that it never made or sold Quigley's products and it doesn't have liability for them. Asbestos, once widely used as an insulator, was later shown to cause cancer.

The last sentence implies that asbestos was only shown to cause cancer after Pfizer acquired Quigley in 1968.  However, this suggests a lack of knowledge of medical history.

In fact, evidence that asbestos was dangerous would have been readily available in 1968. Pulmonary asbestosis was recognized in 1927.(1, noted in 2).  Furthermore, by 1952, as per Dr Richard Doll(3),

The majority of workers (cited by Hueper, 1952) consider that a causal relationship between asbestosis and lung cancer is either proved or is highly probable and the reality of the relationship was agreed at the recent International Symposium on the Epidemiology of Lung Cancer.

Doll reported further data in 1954 and concluded,

lung cancer was a specific industrial hazard of certain asbestos workers....

Summary

So while Pfizer officials ought to have known that in 1968 it was acquiring a company that made products that likely caused lung cancer, for more than 40 years, they have managed to stall payments to now mainly the heirs of people who acquired severe disease due to those products.  This clearly suggests that in this matter the company leadership has consistently put its revenue ahead of its ostensible dedication to peoples' health and well being.  Then again, this is hardly the first example of dubious ethical conduct by Pfizer.  See this post for a list of the 14 legal settlements of allegations of misconduct made by Pfizer since 2000, only one of which was related to the current case.

Furthermore, dedication to short-term revenue over everything else has resulted in huge wealth for Pfizer's hired managers.  Per the Wall Street Journal, only the latest example is,

The total 2012 compensation for Pfizer Inc. (PFE) Chief Executive Ian C. Read was valued at $25.6 million, up 2.5% from 2011, as the drug maker hit two out of three key financial objectives last year. 

Mr. Read's compensation was based partly on the company exceeding targets for total revenue and adjusted earnings-per-share, while missing its target for cash flow in 2012, Pfizer said in a proxy statement filed Thursday with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Presumably, the total revenue target would have been a bit lower if Pfizer had managed to set aside assets to pay the asbestos related claims discussed above in 2012 rather than in 2013.

This relatively anechoic example shows how hollow ring most of the claims by leaders of big health care organizations that they value patients' and the public's health.  That may be convenient public relations puffery, but again and again the bottom line seems to matter more to them.  We have shown numerous examples of mission-hostile management, and of leaders compensated outrageously out of proportion to their contributions to patients' and the public's health.  Thus, why should health care professionals, or patients believe that anything they do puts patients ahead of money?

As we have said so often, health care professionals and society at large needs to hold large health care organizations' leadership accountable for their missions, and push out leaders who put their own pocketbooks and their organizations' revenue ahead of patients' and the public's health. 



References

1.  Cooke WE.  Pulmonary asbestosis.  Br Med J 1972; 2: 1024.
2.  Hasan FM, Nash G, Kazemi H. Asbestos exposure and related neoplasia: the 28 year experience of a major urban hospital.  Am J Med 1978, 65: 649-654. Link here.
3.  Doll R. Mortality from lung cancer in asbestos workers.  Br J Indust Med 1955; 12: 81-86.  Link here. 

A Legal Settlement of One Aspect of the Fall of AHERF, Only 15 Years Later

It only took 15 years, but litigation related to one of the most important, but obscure cases of bad health care leadership and governance from the 1990s was finally settled.   

Background

The Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation (AHERF) was a large integrated health care system formed out of multiple mergers.  AHERF went bankrupt in 1998, leading to massive layoffs, hospital closures, and the near dissolution of a medical school (which ended up taken over by Drexel University).  We last discussed the case in 2012 here.. A summary of other important points about it is appended below. 

As we noted in 2008, although the AHERF bankruptcy appears to be the largest failure of a not-for-profit health care corporation in US history, its story has produced remarkably few echoes for doctors, other health care professionals, health care researchers, and health policy makers. I often use the fall of AHERF as an example in talks, at least the few talks I am allowed to give on such unpleasant subjects. Rarely have more than a few people in the audience heard of AHERF prior to my discussion of it.

I only could locate one article in a medical or health care journal that discussed the case in detail, but was written too early to address it very completely [Burns LR, Cacciamani J, Clement J, Aquino W. The fall of the house of AHERF: the Allegheny bankruptcy. Health Aff (Millwood) 2000; 19: 7-41.]  I doubt the case is used for teaching in most medical or public health schools, although it.was a formative influence on my 2003 article on health care dysfunction [Poses RM. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care. Eur J Int Med 2003; 14: 123-130] and on this Health Care Renewal blog.  (A book about the case, Merger Games, by Judith Swazey, was published in 2012, and is available here as  a set of PDF files from Project Muse for those with the proper password, but it has not yet had much of an impact, and I confess I have not yet read it.)  The lack of discussion of such a significant case is a prime example of the anechoic effect. 

One Legal Settlement, 15 Years Later, for a Secret Amount

But a brief echo of the case did appear in a brief article in the Pittsburgh Tribune Review published in April, 2013:

Lawyers would not say Tuesday how much money an accounting firm will pay to settle a 13-year-old lawsuit claiming it helped destroy one of the state's largest health care systems. 

'It will result in a very significant recovery,' James Jones, one of the lawyers representing the unsecured creditor of the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation, said during a settlement hearing in Pittsburgh federal court.

The creditors in 2000 sued Coopers & Lybrand LLP, the predecessor of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, claiming that if auditors in 1996 and 1997 had informed AHERF's board about the foundation's true financial condition, it would have acted to avoid a bankruptcy that resulted in huge losses. The foundation's assets included the Allegheny General Hospital system.

It seems only fitting, given how anechoic this case has been, that much about this settlement remains obscure,

U.S. District Judge David Cercone, in a joint session with U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Judith Fitzgerald, approved the settlement with PricewaterhouseCoopers. 

The company disputes the method the committee used to calculate losses and denies liability in the settlement.

Joseph McDonough, a lawyer for PricewaterhouseCoopers, agreed the settlement amount is significant. He and Jones declined comment.

Jones said during the hearing that a trial could have lasted 40 days. Preparation for the case generated more than 200 depositions, 19 expert opinions and more than a million documents, he said.

The committee sent more than 3,500 notices to creditors about the proposed settlement, and none objected, he said.

Both sides agreed to keep the amount secret, and they discussed with Fitzgerald how to avoid releasing the amount in filings for related bankruptcy action.

Maybe if the case had somehow generated more echoes, health care professionals and policy makers, and patients and the public at large might have learned some of its lessons.  The story of AHERF is not merely that of an unlucky bankruptcy. It shows what can go wrong when health care is taken over by generic managers who adapt the latest management fads, and health care decision making is ruled by marketing, public relations and propaganda instead of evidence and logic, and allows power to be concentrated in organizations run by imperial CEOs.  .

 

We did not get a chance to learn this history, so we seem bound to repeat it.  

Appendix

Some important points about AHERF not found above (see also this narrative, starting on page 5):

• AHERF, one of the largest health care systems of its day, was built by the poster-boy for health care imperial CEOs, Sherif Abdelhak.
• Abdelhak, who started as food services purchasing manager at Allegeheny General Hospital, was repeatedly hailed as a "visionary" (in the March, 1997, ACP Observer) a "genius," and the like. His plans to create a huge integrated health care system were part of the wave of the future. Abdelhak was even invited to give the prestigious John D Cooper lecture at the annual meeting of the American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC), which was published in Academic Medicine [Abdelhak SS. How one academic health center is successfully facing the future. Acad Med 1996; 71: 329-336.] He proclaimed that "we will need to create new forms of organization that are more flexible, more adaptive, and more agile than ever before." And he announced that "my aim as chief executive has been to unleash the creativity and productive potential of every individual and to provide an environment that encourages teamwork"
• While Abdelhak was making these grandiose promises, he paid himself and his associates very well. For example, he received $1.2 million in the mid-1990s, more than three times the average then for a hospital system CEO. He lived in a hospital supplied mansion worth almost $900,000 in 1989. Five of AHERF's top executives were in the top 10 best paid hospital executives in Philadelphia.
• Although Abdelhak talked of teamwork, he warned the combined faculty of the new Allegheny University of the Health Sciences (AUHS): "Don’t cross me or you will live to regret it."
• As AHERF was hemorrhaging money, Abdelhak continued to pay himself and his cronies lavishly.
• After the AHERF bankruptcy, which was at the time the second largest bankruptcy recorded in the US, Abdelhak was charged with numerous felonies involving receiving charitable assets. In a plea bargain, he pleaded no contest to misusing charitable funds, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to more than 11 months in county prison.

Posted by Roy M. Poses MD to the Health Care Renewal blog

Ghosts in the Criminal Machine - How a Drug Company Can Plead Guilty to Federal Fraud, Yet No One is Held Responsible

We have often discussed how leaders of health care organizations have become increasingly unaccountable for their actions.  A recent, slightly obscure story shows how a corporate admission of guilt to a felony can be used to prevent anyone, including anyone in corporate management, from being held responsible for that fraud.

Basics of the Settlement

The case was that of ISTA Pharmaceuticals.  The basics appeared in brief wire service articles, like this one from Rueters (via Fox News):

Ista Pharmaceuticals pleaded guilty on Friday to charges it used kickbacks and improper marketing to boost sales of a drug meant to treat eye pain and agreed to pay $33.5 million to settle criminal and civil liability, the U.S. Department of Justice said.

The unit of eye care company Bausch & Lomb pleaded guilty to conspiracy to offer kickbacks to induce physicians to prescribe Xibrom, a drug meant to treat pain after cataract surgery, and conspiracy to promote that drug for unapproved uses, including after Lasik and glaucoma surgeries.

Ista agreed as part of a criminal settlement to a $16.63 million fine and an $1.85 million asset forfeiture. It also agreed to a $15 million civil settlement to resolve allegations that its marketing of Xibrom caused false claims to be submitted to government health care programs.

Kickbacks Disguised as Honoraria and Consulting Fees

Note that unlike many such legal settlements involving large health care organizations, this one involved admissions of guilt to felonious criminal offenses.  The severity of the charges apparently arose out of the egregious conduct of company executives.  Colorful details were supplied by the Buffalo (NY) News:

ISTA, which is based in California, admitted using kickbacks to doctors and an illegal marketing campaign as part of an elaborate scheme to increase its sales of Xibrom.

The scheme, outlined in detail in newly released court papers, ranged from company-provided instruction sheets for doctors to continuing medical education programs to promote the drug.

In many cases, ISTA employees were told not to leave printed materials behind in doctors’ offices or to keep records of their meetings with doctors in order to avoid detection by others.

The company went so far as to offer speaking engagements and consulting appearances to doctors in hopes that they might use Xibrom for non-authorized treatments.

Doctors can legally prescribe drugs for non-FDA approved treatments, but drugmakers are prohibited from promoting their products for those uses.

'Essentially they entered into consulting arrangements to induce physicians to prescribe their drug,' said Jeffrey I. Steger, a lawyer in the Consumer Protection Branch of the U.S. Department of Justice.

When [US District Judge Richard J] Arcara asked if money was the doctors’ motivation, Steger said yes.

'Thousands of dollars,' he told the judge.

So here we have a company admitting that it bribed doctors to prescribe its drug, and its techniques of administering bribes included paying the doctors honoraria to give talks, and paying the doctors as consultants.  As an aside, note that many defenders of "collaboration" among doctors and industry sign the praises of doctors "consulting" for industry, and often see nothing wrong with industry paying doctors for "educational" speeches.  Yet here is more evidence that such paid talks and consulting assignments may be nothing more than marketing, and at times are merely disguised bribery.

An Apparently Tough Penalty

An unusual feature of this settlement was that (per Reuters):

As part of the settlement, Ista will be barred from participating in Medicare and Medicaid,...

That would appear to be the death knell for the company, as reported by Reuters,

Bausch & Lomb, which is based in Rochester, New York, said it was pleased to settle the matter, which involved conduct between January 2006 and March 2011, and that it knew of the government probe well before it purchased Ista.

That purchase closed in June 2012 and Bausch and Lomb plans to wind down the Ista corporate entity by year end.

So Bausch and Lomb bought a company that turned out to be valueless?  But wait,...  there's a trick. 

As detailed in FiercePharma,

 ISTA will be barred from doing business with Medicare, Medicaid, et al, for 15 years. Luckily for Bausch + Lomb, however, it bought ISTA in June 2012,  late enough in the game to actually escape the ramifications of exclusion. The exclusion won't begin until 6 months after the settlement date, giving Bausch + Lomb time to transfer ISTA's products out of that subsidiary and shift the drugs over to the Bausch + Lomb label.

A Crime Committed by... No One?

So Bausch and Lomb gets ISTA's drugs, and essentially can resolve the company's felony convictions by relatively small fines, and through management sleight of hand, can finesse ISTA's disbarment from federal programs..  This will occur despite admissions that someone within ISTA, presumably within ISTA management, perhaps high up in ISTA management, per FiercePharma,

instructed reps to avoid leaving a paper trail of their off-label discussions with doctors. Prosecutors had enough evidence of this to persuade ISTA to plead guilty to a felony fraud charge. 'These instructions were given in order to avoid having their conduct relating to unapproved new uses being detected by others, the Justice Department said. 'ISTA agreed that this conduct represented an intent to defraud under the law.'

So felony fraud was committed, but no person apparently committed it.  It was as if a ghost committed the crime.

 

Not only was a crime committed, but apparently by nobody, the corporation within which the crime was committed also becomes obscure.  ISTA became responsible, but by being bought out by Bausch and Lomb, the more severe penalty directed against ISTA will be meaningless.  

 

Should Bausch and Lomb be responsible?  Of course, they claim they should not.  As reported by Bloomberg, 

 

 Rochester, New York-based Bausch & Lomb said the actions occurred 'well before' it acquired Ista in 2012. 

'Bausch & Lomb is committed to earning trust in everything that we do and is pleased to have resolved this pre-acquisition issue,' Bob Bailey, a Bausch & Lomb spokesman, said in a statement. 

In fact, The Hill reported that the bad behavior took place from 2005 to 2010: 

But consider that while ISTA recently became part of Bausch and Lomb, since 2007, Bausch and Lomb has been wholly owned by private equity firm Warburg Pincus.  In fact, as we discussed in in 2009, some people suspected that this maneuver would have allowed Baush and Lomb to settle multiple suits alleging that its products were faulty and dangerous out of the public eye.  So while ISTA is now really Bausch and Lomb is now really Warburg Pincus, no one in the management of ISTA, Bausch and Lomb, or Warburg Pincus apparently will be held responsible for criminal fraud and kickbacks to doctors, even though guilty pleas for these felonies have been made.  So somehow we have admissions that crimes were committed, crimes that compromised the integrity of doctors, and exposed patients to needless side effects, yet these crimes were apparently committed by ... nobody, by a ghost, and even the machine that ghost was in - was it ISTA, Bausch and Lomb, or Warburg Pincus? - becomes a mystery.  Where is Sherlock Holmes when we need him most?.

Summary

This case thus becomes a really striking example of the impunity of health care corporate managers.  They can commit crimes, even felonies, yet the company, but no human beings, is held responsible.  But the company being a company, it cannot go to jail.  And through the magic of obfuscatory corporate take-overs, which company is guilty is not even apparent. 

As we have said ad infinitum,

 We will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.