I believe in 2013 that they are.
(Definition of bad health IT is here: http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/)
I recently posted about two "glitches" in a major EHR seller's clinical systems, Siemens Healthcare, affecting safety-critical functions of medication reconciliation and medication ordering.
Considering these, plus the many "glitches" reported by the only EHR seller who does so via FDA's MAUDE database (see here: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html), and the others posted at this blog at query link: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/glitch, the following issue needs serious consideration by policymakers.
Namely, the issue that enterprise electronic medical command-and-control systems, which today's "EHRs" in reality are, are on their face more risk-prone than the paper systems they are replacing.
The "glitches" reported above are clearly the tip of the iceberg due to industry norms of secrecy, the absence of most of the industry in reporting to FDA MAUDE or anywhere, and my limited sources of information. It is likely the true level of "glitches" in live EHR/clinical IT installations is far, far higher - conservatively, I believe, at least two orders of magnitude.
Workarounds to IT "glitches" such as recommended in the Siemens bulletins at the aforementioned posts cause hospital officials to have to reliably get the notices to all users of the systems, including medical students, nurses, physicians and allied health professionals.
The workarounds also cause users to:
1) have to deviate from habits of use acquired in training and active use of the systems in question;
2) remember, without fail, to deviate from habits of use acquired in training and active use of the systems in question, in effect giving them the responsibility of caring for sick patients and for "sick" information technology;
3) keep in mind any other extant workarounds that exist waiting for "fixes"; and
4) be constantly on guard for information storage failures.
In fact, the recent Siemens "glitches" and workarounds represent a clear danger to patient safety. If these were more conventional medical devices, they'd be recalled.
See my Dec. 14, 2011 post "FDA Recalls Draeger Health IT Device Because This Product May Cause Serious Adverse Health Consequences, Including Death" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/12/fda-recalls-health-it-software-because.html) and July 23, 2012 post "Health IT FDA Recall: Philips Xcelera Connect - Incomplete Information Arriving From Other Systems"(http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/07/health-it-fda-recall-philips-xcelera.html) for examples where health IT defects similar to the Siemens issues were, in fact, recalled.
Further, with paper records or tangible images, a page or image can be lost, or it can be illegible. In the case of lost, in any quality paper record keeping system the information stewards or others using the paper (e.g., office staff or ward clerks) will generally note the absence and act accordingly. Further, illegible notes or orders will most often be recognized as illegible and result in attempted clarification or other corrective actions.
On the other hand, when electronic systems:
1) lose modified information en masse as in the Siemens examples but keep the old, or
2) when outright errors such as en masse truncation occur (as in the thousands of prescriptions whose long-acting suffixes were cut off at Lifespan in Rhode Island, see "Yet another health IT "glitch" affecting thousands" here: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html), or
3) images are lost (see "Potential Image Loss in GE Centricity PACS" here: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/11/potential-image-loss-in-ge-centricity.html) without warning-
- There are no "flags" that the obsolete, truncated or missing information is erroneous.
What remains is perfectly legible, perfectly convincing and perfectly deceiving.
Electronic healthcare information systems on their face create more risk than paper record systems. Further, the problem with "bugs" and "glitches" will not go away with today's industry models of "hiring down" and lack of regulation. Every new upgrade or patch is suspect for introducing new bugs.
Paper does not suffer these issues, unless disappearing ink is used to cross out the old and add new information ...
Not that I am advocating for a return to 100% paper, but certain critical functions probably are best left to paper. Further, hundreds of billions of dollars can certainly buy:
1) a lot of Health Information Management professionals to perform continuous QA of paper,
2) a lot of document imaging systems to make the paper records available anywhere, anytime they are needed, and
3) a lot of data entry personnel to relieve clinicians of clerical burdens so they may use their valuable experience more productively, as guest poster Howard Brody points out at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/07/guest-post-incompetent-management.html.
4) a lot of sensible regulation of this industry's product quality.
-- SS
Showing posts with label bad health IT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bad health IT. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 7, 2013
Today's Bad Health IT Systems: More Dangerous Than Paper?
Labels:
bad health IT,
FDA recall,
GE Centricity,
glitch,
healthcare IT dangers,
healthcare IT defects,
MAUDE,
PACS,
Siemens Healthcare,
workarounds
Friday, March 8, 2013
On EHR's: See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Part 2
Part 1 is here.
This is the second a series of posts I plan on the issue of "See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil" regarding EHR's.
Frequent reminders are needed by all stakeholders, I believe, to think critically about, and take with a big grain of salt, effusive praise by key opinion leaders, politicians, etc. about health IT, and accompanying attempts to deride those critical of the technology, to counterbalance ongoing HIT hyperenthusiasm.
The following quote comes from a May 2010 post "David Blumenthal on health IT safety: nothing to see here, move along":
Blumenthal, at the time Director of ONC at HHS had reportedly stated that:
The "nothing" includes 44 injuries voluntarily reported to FDA and 6 reported deaths in an enviroment where few know where to report such things and where no reporting requirements exist, and a statement from the head of CDRH at FDA that due to systematic impediments to accurate knowledge the known figures likely are a small fraction ("tip if the iceberg") of the actual occurrence.
The FDA internal memo on HIT risk brought to the forefront by investigative reporter Fred Schulte and downloadable here spells out the FDA impediments in some detail. It is not reasonable to believe the head of ONC and an entire ONC committee would have been entirely unaware of the issues. (Later studies are even more concerning, e.g., by IOM and ECRI, as at this blog.)
Yet an ONC committee under his leadership recommended "full steam ahead" anyway.
In the corporate world that is known as gross negligence:
There is nothing to discuss, nothing to debate about that.
The ongoing "what? me worry?" attitude of the pundits needs to be counterbalanced. This series is a small effort (the industry has a lot more control of the channel than I) to catalog the words and call out the pundits in a readily-found format.
More to come in this series.
-- SS
This is the second a series of posts I plan on the issue of "See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil" regarding EHR's.
Frequent reminders are needed by all stakeholders, I believe, to think critically about, and take with a big grain of salt, effusive praise by key opinion leaders, politicians, etc. about health IT, and accompanying attempts to deride those critical of the technology, to counterbalance ongoing HIT hyperenthusiasm.
The following quote comes from a May 2010 post "David Blumenthal on health IT safety: nothing to see here, move along":
Blumenthal, at the time Director of ONC at HHS had reportedly stated that:
http://www.massdevice.com/news/blumenthal-evidence-adverse-events-with-emrs-anecdotal-and-fragmented
... [Blumenthal's] department is confident that its mission remains unchanged in trying to push all healthcare establishments to adopt EMRs as a standard practice. "The [ONC] committee [investigating FDA reports of HIT endangement] said that nothing it had found would give them any pause that a policy of introducing EMR's [rapidly and on a national scale - ed.] could impede patient safety," he said.
The "nothing" includes 44 injuries voluntarily reported to FDA and 6 reported deaths in an enviroment where few know where to report such things and where no reporting requirements exist, and a statement from the head of CDRH at FDA that due to systematic impediments to accurate knowledge the known figures likely are a small fraction ("tip if the iceberg") of the actual occurrence.
The FDA internal memo on HIT risk brought to the forefront by investigative reporter Fred Schulte and downloadable here spells out the FDA impediments in some detail. It is not reasonable to believe the head of ONC and an entire ONC committee would have been entirely unaware of the issues. (Later studies are even more concerning, e.g., by IOM and ECRI, as at this blog.)
Yet an ONC committee under his leadership recommended "full steam ahead" anyway.
In the corporate world that is known as gross negligence:
Gross negligence is a conscious and voluntary disregard of the need to use reasonable care, which is likely to cause foreseeable grave injury or harm to persons, property, or both. It is conduct that is extreme when compared with ordinary Negligence, which is a mere failure to exercise reasonable care.
There is nothing to discuss, nothing to debate about that.
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Claims about HIT beneficence this need to be taken with a big grain of this. |
The ongoing "what? me worry?" attitude of the pundits needs to be counterbalanced. This series is a small effort (the industry has a lot more control of the channel than I) to catalog the words and call out the pundits in a readily-found format.
More to come in this series.
-- SS
Wednesday, March 6, 2013
On EHR's: See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Part 1
This is the first of a series of posts I plan on the issue of "See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil" regarding EHR's. Frequent reminders are needed by all stakeholders, I believe, to think critically about, and take with a big grain of salt, effusive praise by key opinion leaders, politicians, etc. about health IT, and accompanying attempts to deride those critical of the technology, to counterbalance ongoing HIT hyperenthusiasm (e.g., link).
In face of growing evidence of risk and adverse outcomes of bad health IT from multiple sources and organizations (such as this, as just one example), growing advice on risk remediation from government (such as here), and mass privacy violations (see the multiple posts under this query link), it might also be entitled a series on what health IT hyper-enthusiasts "knew, should have known, or should have made it their business to know."
Let's start out with an extract from a post I wrote on June 29, 2003 entitled "Mark Leavitt, Head of CCHIT: Behind the Times and Uninformed on Health IT Realities?". At the time Leavitt was head of CCHIT, a tester and MU compliance/safety certifier of electronic health records systems:
"Laugh these stories off?" That was, and is, simply perverse.
Ironically, this statement was written less than a year before my own mother was seriously and fatally harmed as a result of a health IT-related error.
While I don't proffer claims of "shady conspiracies" (international health IT expert Dr. Richard Cook explains that in a recent guest post "Dr. Richard Cook on the Health IT Sector's Ills"), I do proffer alternate explanations including arrogance, Radical Solutionism, and this.
More to come in this series.
There are many more statements like this one already on this blog, and elsewhere.
-- SS
Note: Part 2 is here.
In face of growing evidence of risk and adverse outcomes of bad health IT from multiple sources and organizations (such as this, as just one example), growing advice on risk remediation from government (such as here), and mass privacy violations (see the multiple posts under this query link), it might also be entitled a series on what health IT hyper-enthusiasts "knew, should have known, or should have made it their business to know."
Let's start out with an extract from a post I wrote on June 29, 2003 entitled "Mark Leavitt, Head of CCHIT: Behind the Times and Uninformed on Health IT Realities?". At the time Leavitt was head of CCHIT, a tester and MU compliance/safety certifier of electronic health records systems:
... The head of CCHIT, Mark Leavitt, has penned the following at iHealthBeat:
June 19, 2009 - Perspectives
Health IT Under ARRA: It's Not the Money, It's the Message
by Mark Leavit
... Before ARRA, most surveys concluded that cost was the No. 1 barrier to EHR adoption. But as soon as it appeared that the cost barrier might finally be overcome, individuals with a deeper-seated "anti-EHR" bent emerged. Their numbers are small, but their shocking claims -- that EHRs kill people, that massive privacy violations are taking place, that shady conspiracies are operating -- make stimulating copy for the media. Those experienced with EHRs might laugh these stories off, but risk-averse newcomers to health IT, both health care providers and policymakers are easily affected by fear mongering.
"Laugh these stories off?" That was, and is, simply perverse.
Ironically, this statement was written less than a year before my own mother was seriously and fatally harmed as a result of a health IT-related error.
![]() |
On EHR's: See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil |
While I don't proffer claims of "shady conspiracies" (international health IT expert Dr. Richard Cook explains that in a recent guest post "Dr. Richard Cook on the Health IT Sector's Ills"), I do proffer alternate explanations including arrogance, Radical Solutionism, and this.
More to come in this series.
There are many more statements like this one already on this blog, and elsewhere.
-- SS
Note: Part 2 is here.
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